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JOHN G. SPRANKLING* 
ABSTRACT 
Legal marijuana is the fastest-growing industry in the United States. 
It is premised on the assumption that marijuana ownership will be 
protected by law. But can marijuana be owned? This Article is the first 
scholarship to explore the issue. 
Federal law classifies marijuana as contraband per se in which 
property rights cannot exist. Yet the Article demonstrates that marijuana 
can now be owned under the law of most states, even though no state 
statutes or decisions expressly address the issue. This conflict presents a 
fundamental question of federalism: Can property rights exist under 
state law if they are forbidden by federal law? The Article explains why 
federal law does not preempt state law on marijuana ownership. 
This result creates a paradox: state courts and other state authorities 
will protect property rights in marijuana, but their federal counterparts 
will not. The Article analyzes the challenges arising from this hybrid 
approach to marijuana ownership. It also examines the fragmented 
status of marijuana ownership in the interstate context, where personal 
relationships or business transactions involve states with conflicting 
approaches to the issue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A plans to divorce B, who operates a marijuana1 store, and obtain 
a share of B’s marijuana in the dissolution proceeding. C intends to 
make a loan to D that is secured by an interest in D’s marijuana. E 
sues F for damages after F negligently burns E’s marijuana crop. 
These hypothetical situations all present the same question: Can 
marijuana be owned? 
 
 1.  Marijuana consists of leaves, buds, and other parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L. 21 
U.S.C. § 802(16) (2012). Accordingly, some authorities refer to it as “cannabis.” However, this 
Article uses the term “marijuana” because this word is more commonly used in U.S. law at 
present. This Article examines property rights in marijuana itself and, by extension, in products 
that contain marijuana or its active ingredient, tetrahydrocannabinol. See infra note 53. Thus, all 
references to “marijuana” include both marijuana and marijuana products unless the context 
indicates otherwise. 
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The traditional answer was “no” because federal and state laws 
uniformly criminalized the possession and transfer of marijuana.2 The 
question arises today because thirty-three states have now legalized 
these actions, although they are still illegal under federal law.3 Yet no 
case or statute expressly addresses the issue. The legalization tidal 
wave has generated extensive scholarship on the criminal and 
constitutional issues that it poses.4 But less attention has been devoted 
to exploring how legalization affects relationships among private 
actors. This Article is the first scholarship to explore whether 
marijuana can be owned.5 
The distinction between property and nonproperty is 
fundamental. As a general matter, the law protects property—such as 
rights in a home—from interference by private parties or government 
actors. By definition, nonproperty receives no protection. Yet the 
determination of what constitutes property is traditionally governed 
by state law, not federal law.6 Legalization naturally leads to the 
questions of whether property rights in marijuana can arise under 
state law and, if so, to what extent the federal government and other 
states must respect those rights. 
These issues are important because legal marijuana is the fastest-
growing industry in the United States.7 Over 34 million American 
 
 2.  Marijuana is considered to be contraband per se under federal law. As a result, it is 
subject to seizure by federal authorities without any payment or judicial process. See infra text 
accompanying notes 61–74.  
 3.  See infra text accompanying notes 77, 81. States that have legalized marijuana, either 
for medical use or for all purposes, are collectively referred to in this Article as “legalization 
states,” while those that continue to criminalize it are referred to as “ban states.” States that 
have legalized marijuana for all purposes are referred to as “full legalization states,” while those 
that have legalized it only for medical purposes are referred to as “medical marijuana states.”  
 4.  See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, A General Theory of Preemption: With Comments on State 
Decriminalization of Marijuana, 58 B.C. L. REV. 895 (2017); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., 
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74 (2015); Scott W. Howe, 
Constitutional Clause Aggregation and the Marijuana Crimes, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779 
(2018); Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ 
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (2009); Don Stemen, 
Beyond the Wars: The Evolving Nature of the U.S. Approach to Drugs, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 375 (2017). 
 5.  This Article does not address property rights in land, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and 
other assets that are used in connection with marijuana cultivation, processing, or sale. Such 
items are classified as derivative contraband under federal law, not contraband per se. See infra 
text accompanying notes 50–51. 
 6.  See infra text accompanying notes 23–41. 
 7.  Chris Bennett, Marijuana Farming Is Now for US Agriculture, Jan. 8, 2018, 
https://www.agweb.com/article/marijuana-farming-is-now-for-us-agriculture-naa-chris-bennett/.  
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adults use marijuana regularly,8 and thousands of new businesses have 
arisen to serve their needs.9 The revenue from legal marijuana sales 
may exceed $13 billion in 2019, and is projected to almost double by 
2022.10 Yet the legal marijuana industry is premised on the assumption 
that marijuana ownership will be protected by state law, despite the 
looming threat posed by contrary federal law. If property rights in 
marijuana cannot exist, this industry will eventually die, harming 
millions of Americans. 
This Article demonstrates that marijuana can be owned under 
state law, despite conflicting federal law. More broadly, it explores a 
fundamental issue in our federal system—the respective roles of 
federal and state governments in defining “property”—and provides a 
template for navigating future property conflicts of this kind. 
Part I of this Article examines the background doctrines that 
shape the analysis of property rights in marijuana: the positivistic view 
that “property” consists of legally-protected rights, not things, and the 
traditional primacy of state law in defining property rights. 
Part II demonstrates that that property rights in marijuana do 
exist in legalization states pursuant to state law, but not under federal 
law. Broadly speaking, marijuana can be owned within certain 
parameters as a matter of state law. The Article then explores the 
uneasy tension between federal and state law on the issue, and 
analyzes the challenges arising from this hybrid approach to 
marijuana ownership. 
Part III examines the fragmented status of marijuana property in 
the interstate context. Marijuana property conflicts may arise from 
relationships or transactions that involve both a legalization state and 
a ban state. These conflicts pose the risk that the ban state may 
undercut the property rights that exist in the legalization state.The 
Article analyzes how contract clauses, choice-of-law principles, and 
comity can be used to minimize this risk. 
 
 8.  Yahoo News/Marist Poll, Weed & The American Family, Apr. 17, 2017, 
http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/misc/Yahoo%20News/20170417_Summary%20Yahoo% 
20News-Marist%20Poll_Weed%20and%20The%20American%20Family.pdf (finding that 
34,688,319 Americans who are 18 or older use marijuana “regularly,” defined as “at least once 
or twice a month”). 
 9.  Roger Vincent, Here’s why pot sellers are paying prime rents for warehouse and 
storefront space, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2018, https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-cannabis-
real-estate-20180331-story.html.  
 10.  Ed Keating, 2019 Marijuana Industry Predictions and Trends, cannabiz media, Dec. 19, 
2018, https://cannabiz.media/2019-marijuana-industry-predictions-and-trends/. 
SPRANKLING_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2019  8:10 PM 
2019] OWNING MARIJUANA 5 
Finally, Part IV explores how potential permanent solutions to the 
marijuana debate may affect property rights. If legislation were 
adopted to legalize marijuana at the national level, regardless of 
conflicting state laws, it should be given retroactive effect. Under the 
more likely solution—where each state may choose whether to 
legalize marijuana—ban states should be required to respect 
marijuana property located in legalization states. 
I. PROPERTY AND FEDERALISM 
A. The Bundle of Rights Metaphor 
The American property system is founded on legal positivism.11 As 
Jeremy Bentham famously remarked: “Property and law are born 
together, and die together. Before laws were made there was no 
property; take away laws, and property ceases.”12 Thus, “property” 
consists of rights enforced by government concerning things.13 If 
government will protect a person’s rights in relation to a particular 
thing, the person has “property.” Conversely, if government will not 
protect such rights, the person has no “property.” 
The scope of governmental protection for property rights has two 
dimensions: vertical and horizontal. The vertical dimension deals with 
the relationship between government actors and private actors; it bars 
government actors from unduly interfering with private property, 
even though regulation is permitted to a certain degree pursuant to 
the police power.14 For example, the Fifth Amendment prohibits 
government from confiscating private property unless such 
 
 11.  See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 4–5 (4th ed. 2017). 
 12.  JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69 (Oceana Publications, Inc. 
1975) (1802). See also Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 
374 (1954) (“That is property to which the following label can be attached. To the world: Keep 
off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold. Signed: Private citizen. 
Endorsed: The State.”). 
 13.  Non-lawyers regularly use the term “property” to refer to an object. SPRANKLING, 
supra note 11, at 4. Judges, lawyers, legislators, and law professors also sometimes use the term 
in this everyday sense, as a shorthand reference for legally-protected rights in relation to a thing. 
For the purposes of this Article, I use the term in its technical sense. Thus, “marijuana 
property” as used herein means legal rights in relation to marijuana and marijuana products. 
Some scholars, however, have criticized the view that property consists of rights. See generally 
Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012).  
 14.  See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“[T]o some extent 
values incident to property . . . are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the 
police power.”).  
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confiscation serves a public purpose and just compensation is paid.15 
The horizontal dimension, in contrast, concerns the role that 
government plays in regulating relationships among private actors. 
Here government prevents private actors from interfering with the 
property rights of others or resolves conflicts among claimants to such 
property. 
The definition of “property” in a legal sense presents two 
questions.16 First, what rights can a person have in relation to a thing? 
Second, what things may be the object of these rights? The 
conventional answer to the first question is the bundle of rights 
metaphor. Courts and scholars define the “bundle of rights that are 
commonly characterized as property”17 as including the right to 
possess, the right to use, the right to exclude, and the right to 
transfer.18 
Similarly, the standard answer to the second question is simple, if 
unsatisfying: property rights may exist in any thing except to the 
extent that some special prohibition exists. In other words, the 
baseline assumption in our system is that property rights may exist in 
virtually any type of thing, including land and buildings affixed to 
land, tangible objects, and intangibles.19 The exceptions to this 
principle usually arise from major policy concerns, such as prohibiting 
property rights due to democratic values (e.g., votes),20 morality (e.g., 
human beings),21 or risks of widespread economic injury (e.g., 
counterfeit money).22 
The logical consequence of the bundle of rights metaphor is that if 
the law prohibits a person from holding the core property rights in a 
particular thing—such as marijuana—then that person has no 
 
 15.  U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 3.  
 16.  SPRANKLING, supra note 11, at 4. 
 17.  Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).  
 18.  See, e.g., Horne v. Dept. of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2015) (observing that a 
government program eliminated “the entire ‘bundle’ of property rights in the appropriated 
raisins—‘the rights to possess, use and dispose of’ them”) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)). See also SPRANKLING, supra note 11, at 7–9 
(discussing rights in bundle).  
 19.  SPRANKLING, supra note 11, at 10–12.  
 20.  Every state prohibits the sale of votes. See Rebecca Murray, Note, Voteauction.net: 
Protected Free Speech or Treason?, 5 J. HIGH TECH L. 357, 363–64 n. 51 (2005) (collecting state 
statutes).  
 21.  Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery arts. 1(1), 2(b), Sept. 25, 1926, 60 
L.N.T.S. 253.  
 22.  Counterfeit money is contraband per se, in which no property rights can exist. See infra 
notes 44–49. 
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property in that thing. Conversely, if no governing law contains such a 
prohibition, then the thing may be owned. 
B. State Primacy in Defining Property 
The boundary between property and nonproperty becomes 
blurred where state and federal laws differ about the categories of 
things in which property rights may exist. 
Dual sovereignty is the heart of federalism. Both the federal 
government and the state government may exercise sovereign 
authority over certain activities within the state’s territory. This poses 
the risk that each government may define property in a somewhat 
different manner. But it is well-settled that the definition of 
property—including the things in which property rights may exist—is 
usually determined by state law.23 As the Supreme Court observed in 
Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection, “[g]enerally speaking, state law defines 
property interests . . . .”24 Similarly, in Giles v. California the Court 
stressed that “States may allocate property rights as they see fit.”25 
The principle that property rights arise from the states, not the 
national government, is a core component of the federal system that 
the Framers envisioned.26 The foundation of international law is that 
each nation-state has sovereignty over its own territory and, 
accordingly, has the exclusive right to adopt laws governing how 
private actors use that territory, including laws governing property 
rights.27 In a broad sense, the Framers envisioned each former colony 
as a separate “state,” with a high degree of sovereignty over its 
territory. Thus, each state was empowered to craft its own laws 
governing property, which might differ to some extent.28 This 
allocation of authority made practical sense in that era, when the 
principal source of wealth was real property—which by definition was 
 
 23.  See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land 
Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 494 (2000) (“Property simply does not exist in the absence 
of state law.”); Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 53, 84 
(“[T]he content of property rights is determined by state law.”); Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist 
Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 257 (2004) (“Property 
rights are the product of positive state law.”).  
 24.  560 U.S. 702, 707 (2010).  
 25.  554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008). See also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) 
(“[P]roperty interests are created and defined by state law.”).  
 26.  See U.S. CONST. amend X.  
 27.  JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 3 (2014).  
 28.  See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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permanently located within state borders—and personal property that 
usually remained within such borders as well. 
As James Madison explained in The Federalist: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the 
State governments are numerous and infinite. . . . The powers 
reserved to the several States will extend to all objects which, in 
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and 
properties of the people . . . .29 
The Framers structured a national legislature with limited 
powers.30 These did not include the power to define property rights 
except in two areas: patents and copyrights;31 and “Legislation in all 
Cases whatsoever” for the future District of Columbia and “like 
Authority” over forts and similar federal installations, which would 
presumably include property rights in these regions.32 The Tenth 
Amendment specifically provided that “[t]he powers not delegated” 
to the federal government—including the power to define property 
rights in almost all situations—were “reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”33 
Under the Constitution, then, the states were to have the 
dominant role in the horizontal dimension of property rights: how 
government protection of property mediates relationships among 
private actors.34 For example, state law regulates the manner in which 
property may be acquired in various transactions, including gifts, 
purchases, leases, and security interests. It protects property from 
interference by non-owners, in contexts ranging from enforcing the 
right to exclude to providing a remedy for property damage. It also 
determines how property is divided among families (e.g., at divorce or 
death) and among business owners (e.g., at the dissolution of a 
 
 29.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292–93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(emphasis added). See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (quoting this language 
with approval).  
 30.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
 31.  Id. cl. 8.  
 32.  Id. cl. 17.  
 33.  Id. amend. X.  
 34.  The principal exceptions are (1) patents and copyrights; (2) property rights on federal 
installations; and (3) bankruptcy. By regulating patents and copyrights, federal law effectively 
supersedes conflicting state laws dealing with intellectual property and thus precludes states 
from creating such rights. See supra note 31. Similarly, property rights on federal installations 
are exclusively governed by federal law. See supra note 32. Finally, the power of Congress to 
establish bankruptcy laws necessarily means that federal law will impact state-created property 
rights of creditors. U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 4.  
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partnership or the partition of a cotenancy). All of these examples 
and many others are governed by how the relevant state law defines 
property. In practice, as the Framers envisioned, the vast majority of 
property law today is state law.35 
The respective roles of federal and state laws in defining the 
vertical dimension of property rights—the relationship between 
governments and private actors—are less clear. There is no body of 
general federal property law. Thus, the vertical dimension is largely 
the province of specialized bodies of law other than property law, such 
as constitutional law, criminal law, or tax law.36 The definition of 
property is important in the application of these doctrines, but they 
are not viewed as property law. 
Certainly, the Framers were concerned that the federal 
government might interfere with state-created property rights. In this 
light, the property-related provisions of the Bill of Rights can be seen 
as attempts to restrict such interference—largely in reaction to the 
British government’s infringement of colonial property rights before 
American independence.37 For example, the Second Amendment bars 
the federal government from infringing the right to “keep and bear 
Arms,”38 while the Third Amendment prohibits it from interfering 
with the right to use real property by quartering troops “in any 
house.”39 More broadly, the Fifth Amendment restricts the federal 
government from depriving an owner of property absent due process, 
a “public use” for the property, and payment of “just compensation.”40 
 
 35.  See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY (5th ed. 2016); WILLIAM STOEBUCK & 
DALE WHITMAN, LAW OF PROPERTY (3d ed. 2000). 
 36.  See, e.g., Drye v. United States, 538 U.S. 49, 58 (1999) (“We look initially to state law 
to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then 
to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer’s state-delineated rights qualify as ‘property’ 
or ‘rights to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.”).  
 37.  For an analysis of the property-related provisions of the Bill of Rights, see BERNARD 
H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
102–20 (2001).  
 38.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Framers were aware that James II had attempted to 
expand the Catholic influence in England by seizing weapons from Protestants in the mid-1600s; 
the 1689 English Declaration of Rights, which expressly protected the right to bear arms in 
response to these seizures, was the forerunner of the Second Amendment. See District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593 (2008).  
 39.  U.S. CONST. amend. III. The British violated the traditional property rights of 
American owners by quartering troops in private homes, one of the abuses chronicled in the 
Declaration of Independence; this experience prompted adoption of the Third Amendment. See 
Thomas G. Sprankling, Note, Does Three Equal Five? Reading the Takings Clause in Light of 
the Third Amendment’s Protection of Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 124–29 (2012).  
 40.  U.S. CONST. amend. V, §§ 2, 3. 
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Even in applying these constitutional protections, however, federal 
courts usually defer to state law in defining the scope of property.41 
More recently, particularly with the rise of the modern regulatory 
state after World War II, actions taken by the federal government 
have increasingly affected state-created property rights.42 In 
particular, federal statutes adopted under the authority of the 
Commerce Clause that primarily deal with subjects other than 
property sometimes affect property rights. For example, federal 
environmental statutes constrain—and in some situations effectively 
nullify—property rights arising under state law, primarily in the 
interest of protecting public health or endangered species.43 
Further—and directly related to this Article—federal criminal 
statutes governing activities linked to interstate commerce also affect 
state-created property rights. Federal law classifies certain things as 
contraband per se: objects that are “intrinsically illegal in character,”44 
“the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime.”45 An 
object is considered to be contraband per se “if there is no legal 
purpose to which the object could be put.”46 Marijuana is classified as 
contraband per se under federal law.47 The classification of an object 
as contraband per se directly affects property rights, particularly in the 
context of forfeiture to the government.48 In general, property rights 
cannot exist in contraband per se. Accordingly, the federal 
 
 41.  See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 
(2000) (discussing the definition of “property” for purposes of the Constitution).  
 42.  See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 142–71 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the modern 
regulatory state’s effect on property rights).  
 43.  For example, the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012), may 
effectively bar the development of certain private lands. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (upholding regulation issued pursuant 
to Endangered Species Act that prevented logging of certain old growth forests). 
 44.  One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700 (1965). 
 45.  Id. at 699. 
 46.  United States v. Harrell, 530 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 47.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 27 (2005) (“The CSA designates marijuana as 
contraband for any purpose.”) (emphasis in original). See also Schmidt v. County of Nevada, 
No. 2:10-CV-3022FCD/EFB, 2011 WL 2967786, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (holding that the 
plaintiff had no “property interest” in marijuana because it is “undisputably [sic] illegal and 
contraband per se”).  
 48.  Although marijuana is contraband per se, it is still considered to be “property” for the 
limited purpose of prosecuting property crimes such as robbery or theft. See, e.g., Taylor v. 
Phillips, No. 05-CV-2596, 2016 WL 5678582, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016) (marijuana is 
property for the purposes of establishing a Hobbs Act robbery); State v. Turner, 2017 Iowa 
App. LEXIS 339, at *9–10 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2017) (“We agree contraband may be 
considered property when prosecuting criminal offenses such as robbery and theft.”). 
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government may seize such contraband at any time without infringing 
the possessor’s rights under the Constitution. In this context, the Fifth 
Circuit concluded in Cooper v. City of Greenwood that “one cannot 
have a property right in that which is not subject to legal 
possession.”49 
The counterpart to contraband per se is derivative contraband: 
“items which are not inherently unlawful but which may become 
unlawful because of the use to which they are put—for example, an 
automobile used in a bank robbery.”50 Because a property interest in 
such an item “is not extinguished automatically if the item is put to 
unlawful use, forfeiture of such an item is permitted only as 
authorized by statute” consistent with due process.51 
II. STATE V. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: RECOGNIZING MARIJUANA 
PROPERTY 
A. The Property-Nonproperty Boundary 
For decades, federal and state laws uniformly criminalized the 
possession or transfer of marijuana.52 It was deemed to be contraband 
per se in which property rights could not exist. As a result, it could be 
confiscated at any time by federal or state officials without 
compensation. But the modern legalization of marijuana by most 
states challenges this approach. Today either property rights cannot 
exist in marijuana at all, or such rights can exist under the laws of 
legalization states but not under federal law or the laws of ban states. 
Millions of Americans use marijuana for medical treatment or 
recreation. And the legalization wave has produced tens of thousands 
of new marijuana businesses, including growers, manufacturers, 
processors, and retailers.53 These businesses all routinely possess large 
 
 49.  904 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 1990). See also Bacon v. United States, No. 2-13-CV-392, 
2014 WL 12531093, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2014) (“A person may not claim a property 
interest in property he has no legal right to possess because the possession of the property is 
illegal.”).  
 50.  Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305.  
 51.  Id. See also United States v. 37.29 Pounds of Semi-Precious Stones, 7 F.3d 480, 485 (6th 
Cir. 1993).  
 52.  See infra text accompanying notes 61–70, 75. See generally MARK K. OSBECK & 
HOWARD BROMBERG, MARIJUANA LAW IN A NUTSHELL 71–87 (2017) (discussing federal and 
states laws that criminalize the possession and transfer of marijuana). However, “marijuana was 
legal to grow and consume” in all states until the early twentieth century, when some 
jurisdictions began to criminalize it. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 4, at 81.  
 53.  Marijuana stores and dispensaries in full legalization states commonly sell both 
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quantities of marijuana.54 For example, California growers alone 
produce 13.5 million pounds of marijuana each year.55 Without 
legally-protected property rights in marijuana, these businesses could 
not exist—and millions of Americans would be deprived of the legal 
ability to obtain marijuana. 
Consider hypothetical farmer G, who holds a license to cultivate 
marijuana in a legalization state. G cannot carry on her business 
unless the state recognizes her rights to possess marijuana and to 
exclude others from its possession. Otherwise, government officials or 
ordinary citizens could seize G’s marijuana without payment. 
Similarly, G’s right to sell or otherwise transfer her crop must be 
protected. As Richard Posner concludes, “without property rights 
there is no incentive” for a farmer to plant and nurture her crop 
“because there is no reasonably assured reward” for doing so.56 
The legal marijuana industry is premised on the apparent belief 
that property rights in marijuana will be protected by law.57 For 
example, the industry assumes that: contracts concerning marijuana, 
such as insurance policies, leases, loan agreements, and purchase 
contracts, will be enforced; marijuana will be viewed as an asset that 
corporations, partnerships, trusts, and other entities may legally hold; 
courts will provide a remedy against tortious conduct that damages 
 
marijuana itself and various marijuana products. These products may include marijuana 
concentrates (e.g., oils and waxes), infusions into other types of products (e.g., lotions, pills, and 
shampoos), and edibles. John Campbell & Sahib Singh, Budding Torts: Forecasting Emerging 
Tort Liability in the Cannabis Industry, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 338, 346–48 (2018). 
Examples of edibles include “rice crispy treats, lollipops, lemonade, butter, cookies, cooking 
oils, agave nectar, caramels, and even bacon cheddar biscuits.” Mystica M. Alexander & 
William P. Wiggins, The Lure of Tax Revenue from Recreational Marijuana: At What Price?, 15 
U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 131, 159 (2015). 
 54.  A single store or dispensary may sell thousands of pounds of marijuana per year. See, 
e.g., Susan K. Livio, 2017 was banner year for medical marijuana, STAR-LEDGER, May 23, 2018, 
2018 WLNR 15375272 (noting that one New Jersey dispensary sold 2,302 pounds in 2017). 
Further, one farm can produce tens of thousands of pounds of marijuana per year. See, e.g., 
Daniel Smithson, New medical pot protections praised by industry advocate, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Apr. 2, 2018, 2018 WLNR 9886420 (describing a Florida facility that will produce 
27,000 pounds per year). 
 55.  Pushing pot back into the shadows with high taxes, ORANGE CNTY. REGISTER, Nov. 
11, 2017, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/11/11/pushing-marijuana-back-into-the-shadows-with-
high-taxes/.  
 56.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40 (9th ed. 2014). 
 57.  It is axiomatic that every business in a market economy relies on enforcement of 
property rights. See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast, Capitalism, Democracy, and Countermajoritarian 
Institutions, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 255, 256–57 (2015).  
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marijuana; and investments in marijuana and marijuana-related 
businesses will be respected.58 
Yet, as discussed below, the question of marijuana ownership is a 
conundrum. Under the American tradition that state law defines 
property rights, marijuana can be owned under state law in 
legalization states.59 Thus, state law prohibits third parties or the state 
itself from illegally interfering with farmer G’s marijuana. But under 
federal law, marijuana is contraband per se that cannot be owned.60 As 
a result, federal authorities may seize G’s marijuana at any time 
without judicial process or payment of compensation. The result is a 
legal paradox: G owns marijuana (under state law) but does not own 
marijuana (under federal law). 
B. Federal Law: The Controlled Substances Act 
Federal regulation of marijuana is based on the Controlled 
Substances Act of 1970 (CSA), a comprehensive public health statute 
that covers hundreds of drugs.61 Today, many authorities believe that 
marijuana poses little or no risk to human health and in fact has 
substantial medical value.62 However, it is still classified as a Schedule 
I drug, meaning that it “has a high potential for abuse,” it “has no 
currently accepted medical use,” and “[t]here is a lack of accepted 
safety for use of the drug . . . under medical supervision.”63 Examples 
of other Schedule I drugs include ecstasy,64 heroin,65 and LSD.66 
 
 58.  Yet under the federal Controlled Substances Act, the federal government is 
empowered to seize marijuana as contraband per se, without judicial process or payment of 
compensation. See infra text accompanying notes 61–71. Thus, marijuana businesses and their 
customers face the risk that their marijuana, which is legal under state law, may nonetheless be 
forfeited to the federal government. However, to date, the federal government has generally not 
exercised this authority in connection with sales that are legal under state law. See infra text 
accompanying notes 128–37. Presumably, the participants in the legal marijuana industry 
believe that the federal government will continue this policy.  
 59.  See infra text accompanying notes 77–86.  
 60.  See infra text accompanying notes 67–74.  
 61.  21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (2012). The CSA uses the term “marihuana,” which is defined as 
“all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L.,” its seeds, its resin, “and every compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin,” with 
limited exceptions such as stalks or fibers. 21 U.S.C § 802(16) (2012). This definition accordingly 
includes products that contain marijuana or its active ingredient, tetrahydrocannabinol. 
 62.  See OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 52, at 404–14 (summarizing research on health 
effects).  
 63.  21 U.S.C. § 812(c), Sched. I(c)(10) (2012). There is widespread agreement that 
marijuana is not as dangerous as other drugs listed in Schedule I. For example, in United States 
v. Kiefer, 477 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1973), the Second Circuit noted that “[i]t is apparently true 
that there is little or no basis for concluding that marihuana is as dangerous a substance as some 
of the other drugs included in Schedule I.” Yet in United States v. Pickard, 100 F. Supp. 3d 981, 
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The CSA imposes criminal penalties for the possession or transfer 
of any Schedule I drug, including marijuana. Section 844 provides that 
it is “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a 
controlled substance” such as marijuana, regardless of the amount 
involved or the purpose for the possession. The penalty for a first 
offense is imprisonment for up to a year and/or a fine of at least 
$1,000.67 Further, under section 841 it is unlawful for anyone to either 
“possess” marijuana “with intent . . . to distribute” it or to “distribute” 
it, regardless of amount.68 In this context, “distribute” means “to 
deliver (other than by administering or dispensing) a controlled 
substance.”69 This language is broad enough to encompass any 
intentional transfer of marijuana by one person to another, whether 
by gift, sale, or otherwise. The penalty for distributing 1,000 kilograms 
of marijuana is imprisonment for ten years or longer and/or a fine of 
up to $50 million.70 
Since the mere possession or transfer of marijuana is illegal under 
the CSA, the argument logically follows that marijuana is contraband 
per se that cannot be the subject of property rights under federal law. 
Indeed, this is the conventional view. As a federal court explained in 
Schmidt v. County of Nevada, “[u]nder the federal Controlled 
Substances Act . . . it is illegal for any private person to possess 
marijuana . . . [and, accordingly] under federal law marijuana is 
contraband per se, which means that no person can have a cognizable 
legal interest in it.”71 
This result is consistent with the traditional view that property 
consists of legal rights in relation to a particular thing. As shown 
 
1009 (E.D. Cal. 2015), the court refused to find that “its placement on Schedule I is so arbitrary 
or unreasonable as to render it unconstitutional.” There is evidence that long-term marijuana 
use can cause adverse health effects. See GERALD F. UELMEN & ALEX KREIT, 1 DRUG ABUSE 
AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK § 3:75, Dec. 2017 Update.  
 64.  21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(1) (2012).  
 65.  Id. § 812(b)(10).  
 66.  Id. § 812(c)(9).  
 67.  Id. § 844(a).  
 68.  Id. § 841(a)(1).  
 69.  Id. § 802(11).  
 70.  Id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii).  
 71.  No. 2:10-CV-3022FCD/EFB, 2011 WL 2967786, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2011). See 
also Barrios v. Cnty. of Tulare, No. 1:13:CV-1665, 2014 WL 2174746, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 
2014) (“Because marijuana is contraband under federal law, Barrios had no property interest in 
the marijuana that was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.”). The 
Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of property rights in marijuana, though it has held 
that Congress was empowered to adopt the CSA pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).  
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above, the CSA expressly precludes the rights to possess or transfer 
marijuana. In practice, it also eliminates the rights to use and exclude. 
It is impossible for anyone to use a tangible object that cannot be 
possessed. Similarly, a person who has no right to possess such an 
object cannot protect her possession against intrusions by third 
parties. Because the CSA abrogates all the core rights in the 
metaphorical bundle, it effectively prohibits ownership of marijuana. 
Moreover, an independent basis for finding that federal law bars 
property rights in marijuana is arguably found in section 881(a) of the 
CSA, its civil forfeiture provision.72 This section provides that “[a]ll 
controlled substances which have been . . . distributed . . . or acquired 
in violation of this subchapter” and “[a]ll controlled substances which 
have been possessed in violation of this subchapter” “shall be subject 
to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in 
them . . . .”73 In Mazin v. True, a federal court quoted this provision and 
concluded that “marijuana is contraband per se under federal law, 
which expressly disavows any property right in such contraband.”74 
Accordingly, the federal government is empowered to seize marijuana 
from anyone who possesses it as a matter of federal law. 
In summary, there are compelling arguments that marijuana 
cannot be owned—at least for the purposes of federal law. Yet this 
analysis does not resolve the separate question of whether property 
rights can exist in marijuana as a matter of state law. 
C. State Law: The Legalization Tidal Wave 
Like federal law, state laws imposed criminal penalties for the 
possession or transfer of marijuana for decades.75 Under this 
 
 72.  However, the better interpretation of the italicized language in § 881(a) is that it 
applies only after a forfeiture occurs. CSA § 881(h) provides that “[a]ll right, title, and interest in 
property described in subsection (a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon 
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture in this section.” 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (2012) 
(emphasis added). Thus, the effect of the forfeiture process is to transfer existing property rights 
from an owner to the federal government. It is important to note that the items listed in 
subsection (a) include both contraband per se and derivative contraband. In context, the 
references to “property” in § 881(a) and (h) can only refer to derivative contraband, because 
forfeiture of such property (and thus transfer of property rights) occurs only when an illegal 
“act” is committed. Because property rights can never exist in contraband per se under federal 
law, the possessor has no “right, title, or interest” to transfer.  
 73.  21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1), (8) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 74.  No. 1:14-CV-00654-REB-CBS, 2015 WL 1228321, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 16, 2015).  
 75.  All fifty states eventually adopted statutes similar to the CSA, largely based on the 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (hereinafter “UNIFORM CSA”). UNIF. 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 9 Part V U.L.A. 853, 860 (2007). As a result, the possession or 
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approach, marijuana was contraband per se in which property rights 
could not exist. But in recent years, most states have abandoned this 
absolutist position by adopting statutes that legalize the possession 
and transfer of marijuana under certain circumstances. These statutes 
do not expressly address the broader issue of marijuana ownership; 
nor has any court directly ruled on the question. However, analyzed in 
light of background principles of property law, these statutes support 
the view that marijuana can be owned—to some extent—as a matter 
of state law.76 
Led by Colorado and Washington, ten states have legalized 
marijuana for all purposes—subject to various restrictions—and have 
thus sanctioned its possession and transfer.77 For example, Colorado’s 
voter-approved amendment to the state constitution authorizes the 
cultivation, possession, purchase, transfer, transport, and use of 
marijuana.78 Similarly, the successful voter initiative in Washington 
provides that the possession of marijuana by an adult and the 
production, delivery, distribution, sale, or possession of marijuana by 
state-approved businesses are permitted under state law.79 
Broadly speaking, the legalization statutes in these states make a 
distinction between marijuana businesses and marijuana users. Under 
strict regulation, businesses are permitted to grow, possess, and 
 
distribution of marijuana became illegal in all states.  
 76.  A number of states that prohibit the possession or transfer of marijuana for any 
purpose do permit the possession and sale of cannabidiol, a non-psychoactive substance that is 
derived from the cannabis plant. See OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 52, at 219. Cannabidiol 
would seemingly be classed as a “derivative” of cannabis, and thus fall within the definition of 
“marihuana” under the CSA. 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2012). However, the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration has approved the use of cannabidiol for the treatment of seizures related to 
certain types of epilepsy. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA approves 
first drug comprised of an active ingredient derived from marijuana to treat rare, severe forms of 
epilepsy, June 25, 2018, https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ 
ucm611046.htm. 
 77.  Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, 
Vermont, and Washington have legalized recreational use of marijuana. Jeremy Berke & Skye 
Gould, States where marijuana is legal, BUS. INSIDER, Mar. 26, 2019, 
https://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-states-2018-1.  
 78.  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN., CONST. art. XVIII, § 16(3) (West 2017). For example, 
“possessing, using, displaying, purchasing, or transporting . . . one ounce or less of marijuana” is 
lawful. Id. But see People v. Crouse, 388 P.3d 39 (Colo. 2017) (holding that section of state’s 
medical marijuana law which required officers to return seized marijuana to patient was 
preempted by the CSA); Joel S. Neckers & Joel M. Pratt, The Marijuana Industry after Crouse: 
Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?, 47 COLO. LAW. 27, 29 (Jan. 2018) (warning that under 
Crouse “even an accusation of wrongdoing that leads to a cannabis seizure could mean the end 
of a business”).  
 79.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.50.360, 69.50.363, 69.50.366 (West 2017).  
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process large quantities of marijuana, and to sell small quantities. 
Marijuana users are authorized to possess and use small quantities in 
these states, and may grow a limited number of marijuana plants. For 
example, in California it is lawful for a person to possess up to 28.5 
grams of marijuana and to cultivate up to six marijuana plants.80 
Further, twenty-three states have legalized marijuana for the 
limited purpose of medical treatment.81 Although their approaches 
differ to some extent, they share the same basic pattern: closely-
regulated businesses may cultivate, process, possess, and sell large 
quantities of marijuana; patients with a doctor’s prescription may 
purchase and possess small quantities and also grow a few marijuana 
plants. For example, North Dakota authorizes residents to “process or 
sell, possess, transport, dispense, or use marijuana” for medical 
purposes under limited circumstances.82 A “manufacturing facility” 
can possess up to 1,000 plants, while a “dispensary” can have up to 
3,500 ounces of marijuana.83 A qualifying patient may purchase up to 
2.5 ounces of marijuana from a dispensary over a 30-day period, and 
may possess up to 3 ounces during this time.84 
These legalization statutes are based on the belief that marijuana 
is relatively harmless, and indeed can be an effective medical 
treatment for some patients. Viewed from this perspective, marijuana 
should not be listed as a Schedule I drug—unlike other Schedule I 
drugs that are clearly harmful such as heroin and LSD. Under this 
approach, marijuana is seen as far less dangerous than other things 
that are considered to be contraband per se under federal law. 
The legalization wave has a profound impact on marijuana 
ownership. Although no statute or case directly addresses the issue, it 
now seems clear that marijuana may be owned in most states as a 
matter of state law. With the repeal of state statutes that criminalized 
marijuana, the traditional principle that property rights may exist in 
any thing now applies. Further, the state legalization statutes 
effectively recognize the core elements that constitute the traditional 
bundle of rights: the rights to possess, use, transfer, and exclude. These 
statutes expressly validate the rights to possess and transfer marijuana 
 
 80.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.1(a) (1), (3) (West 2017).  
 81.  Berke & Gould, supra note 77.  
 82.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-24.1-02 (2017).  
 83.  Id. § 19-24.1-24.  
 84.  Id. § 19-24.1-01(2).  
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under certain circumstances.85 The legalization of possession, in turn, 
effectively recognizes the rights to use and exclude. Prior state law 
eliminated the right to use only indirectly; because marijuana could 
not be possessed, it could not be used. Further, given legal recognition 
of the right to possess, it logically follows that state law will protect 
this right by preventing third parties from interfering with that 
possession, thus recognizing the owner’s right to exclude. In sum, 
because a person may now hold the core property rights in marijuana, 
marijuana property exists under state law.86 
This historic transition affects both the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions of property rights. Under state law, each legalization state 
will respect marijuana ownership in disputes among private actors to 
at least some extent87 and will refrain from seizing legally-owned 
marijuana from private actors.88 
D. Resolving the Federal-State Conflict 
1. Joint Sovereignty in Context 
Our hypothetical marijuana farmer G holds property rights in her 
crop under state law. But under federal law, she has no property rights 
in the crop—and federal officials may confiscate it at any time. These 
inconsistent approaches to marijuana property raise the question of 
preemption. 
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that the 
“Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
. . . Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”89 It arguably 
 
 85.  See supra notes 77–84. Moreover, statutes in some legalization states provide that 
citizens are entitled to the return of marijuana that they legally possess when it is illegally seized 
by law enforcement authorities. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-2B-4(G) (2007); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 475B.922(2) (2018).  
 86.  Because all legalization states still restrict marijuana to some extent, however, the 
scope of marijuana property is limited. For example, because a legal marijuana user in 
California can possess only up to 28.5 grams, a person who possesses 100 grams does not hold 
property rights in the additional 71.5 grams. See supra note 80.  
 87.  Cf. Muridan v. Redl, 413 P.3d 1072, 1081–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018) (affirming trial 
court’s determination that proceeds from the sale of marijuana equipment constituted 
community-like property and were thus subject to “equitable property division” upon the 
termination of a couple’s relationship).  
 88.  See, e.g., Oregon v. Ellis, 316 P.3d 412 (Or. Ct. App. 2013) (holding trial court erred in 
denying defendant’s motion to return “usable marijuana” after police seized it during 
defendant’s arrest for driving while intoxicated since he held a medical marijuana card).  
 89.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.  
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follows that even states which have legalized marijuana—and, more 
to the point, judges in these states—should follow the federal view 
that marijuana property cannot exist. 
But both federal and state governments possess “elements of 
sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”90 As the Supreme Court 
has explained, the states retain “substantial sovereign authority under 
our constitutional system.”91 One traditional area of state sovereignty 
is the state’s right to determine what constitutes property within its 
borders, as discussed in Part I above. Accordingly, federal law will not 
supersede the state law definition of property absent either express 
preemption or implied preemption. However, the CSA probably does 
not preempt the state laws that effectively recognize marijuana 
property. 
2. Preemption Is Unlikely 
Express preemption exists when Congress clearly states that 
federal law will supersede state law.92 Implied preemption occurs in 
three situations: (1) field preemption, where “Congress . . . has 
determined [that the field of law] must be regulated by its exclusive 
governance;”93 (2) conflict preemption, where “compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility;”94 and (3) 
conflict preemption, where the state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”95 
In applying these principles, courts use a presumption against 
preemption. As the Supreme Court observed in Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Lohr, in preemption cases, “particularly those in which Congress has 
‘legislated in a field which the states have traditionally occupied,’ we 
‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”96 Because property rights 
are created under state law, this presumption applies with particular 
 
 90.  Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 (2012).  
 91.  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).  
 92.  Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass’n, Inc. v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 469 
(1984).  
 93.  Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399.  
 94.  Id. (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).  
 95.  Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  
 96.  518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947) and Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715–716 (1985)).  
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force to the question of whether the CSA supersedes state-created 
property rights in marijuana. 
The CSA is an example of “cooperative federalism.”97 It was 
intended to be part of an integrated system for regulating controlled 
substances that federal and state governments would share. Under 
this framework, the federal government would take a lead role while 
states would have parallel authority under state law.98 Accordingly, 
almost all states enacted legislation patterned on the CSA, most 
commonly by adopting the Uniform Controlled Substances Act of 
1970 (Uniform CSA).99 As its Prefatory Note observes, the Uniform 
CSA was “designed to complement the new Federal . . . legislation 
and provide an interlocking trellis of Federal and State law to enable 
government at all levels to more effectively control the drug abuse 
problem.”100 The Uniform CSA largely criminalizes the same conduct 
that the CSA covers.101 However, it allows each state to establish its 
own schedules of controlled substances as a matter of state law, which 
may differ from the federally-regulated substances listed in the CSA 
schedules.102 
Because federal and state governments have concurrent authority 
over controlled substances, Congress took care to minimize the risk of 
preemption. CSA section 903 specifies that no provision in the act: 
should be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress 
to occupy the field in which that provision operates, to the 
exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter that would 
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a 
 
 97.  See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 4; Todd Grabarsky, Conflicting Federal and State 
Medical Marijuana Policies: A Threat to Cooperative Federalism, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2013); 
Matthew A. Melone, Federal Marijuana Policy: Homage to Federalism in Form; Potemkin 
Federalism in Substance, 63 WAYNE L. REV. 2015 (2018).  
 98.  In practice, the federal government “has prosecuted large-scale traffickers and drug 
cartels and left prosecution of everyday, street level marijuana activity to the states.” OSBECK & 
BROMBERG, supra note 52, at 472.  
 99.  UNIFORM CSA, supra note 75, at 853. 
 100.  Id. at 854. 
 101.  Compare 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844(a) (2012) with UNIFORM CSA § 401(a), (c), supra note 
75, at 886–87. 
 102.  UNIFORM CSA § 201(a) provides that a designated state agency may “add substances 
to or delete or reschedule all substances in the schedules.” UNIFORM CSA, supra note 75, at 
866. The Comment to this section explains that “[t]he Uniform Act is not intended to prevent a 
State from adding or removing substances from the schedules.” Id. at 868. Thus, the drafters of 
the Uniform CSA contemplated that a state could choose not to criminalize the possession or 
transfer of a substance such as marijuana under state law.  
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positive conflict between that provision of this subchapter and that 
State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.103 
There is no serious argument that express preemption applies to 
the state laws that effectively recognize marijuana property. An 
example of express preemption is found in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 
where the Supreme Court held that a federal statute concerning meat 
packages which provided that “requirements in addition to, or 
different than, those made under this Act may not be made by any 
State” preempted state law.104 No section of the CSA contains a 
similar express provision; in fact, Congress specifically restricted the 
preemptive scope of the CSA, as shown in the portion of section 903 
quoted above.105 It might be asserted that the phrase in CSA section 
881(a)(1) that “no property right shall exist” in marijuana and other 
Schedule I substances supports express preemption. But nothing in 
that section expressly purports to affect state law.106 Moreover, in 
context this language was intended to relate only to the status of 
property rights after forfeiture107 to the federal government, not to 
property rights before forfeiture.108 Because no provision of the CSA 
 
 103.  21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4629 
(explaining that this section bars preemption unless there is a “direct and positive conflict” 
between federal and state legislation).  
 104.  430 U.S. 519, 530–31 (1977).  
 105.  21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). 
 106.  The only decision exploring the impact of this language on state-created property 
rights is Mazin v. True, No. 1:14-CV-00654-REB-CBS, 2015 WL 1228321 (D. Colo. Mar. 16, 
2015). There the court interpreted it to mean that “there is no recognized or protected property 
right in marijuana under federal law.” Id. at *2 (emphasis added). In response to the argument 
that “state law defines property rights,” the court reasoned that “[t]he plaintiff has no federally 
protected property interest in his marijuana even if that marijuana is legal under Colorado law.” 
Id. (emphasis added).  
 107.  See supra note 72.  
 108.  The statutory language makes this reasonably clear. The complete introductory phrase 
in section 881(a) reads: “The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no 
property right shall exist in them . . . .” (emphasis added). In context, this subsection was not 
intended to apply to state-created property rights. Legislative history also supports this 
interpretation. The House Report on the CSA explained that this subsection merely “sets forth 
the conditions for forfeiture and the property to be forfeited” under federal law. H.R. REP. NO. 
91-1444, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4623. There is no indication that it was also intended to supersede 
state law. In fact, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act contains its own provisions that 
govern forfeiture under state law. UNIFORM CSA § 505(a), supra note 75. Cf. People v. 
Odenwald, 285 P. 406, 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930) (observing that nearly-identical language 
included in the Volstead Act, which prohibited the possession of liquor, “was clearly intended 
solely to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties,” not to eliminate state-
created property rights).  
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expressly states that it will supersede state law, there can be no 
express preemption.109 
Next, as section 903 makes clear, Congress has chosen not to 
“occupy the field” of controlled substances regulation.110 Rather, the 
CSA contemplates that federal and state governments have shared 
authority in this area.111 Therefore, field preemption does not apply to 
marijuana property laws.112 
The question of conflict preemption based on physical 
impossibility is more complex. Most decisions conclude that the CSA 
does not preempt state legalization laws as a general matter.113 For 
example, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the defendant city’s 
impossibility claim in Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming,114 because the 
state’s medical marijuana statute did not require the city to violate the 
CSA. A Rhode Island court reached the same conclusion, noting that 
nothing in the state law legalizing marijuana “requires the Town—or 
anyone—to ‘manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess’ marijuana 
or otherwise violate the CSA.”115 In short, the state laws legalizing 
marijuana do not require its cultivation, possession, or transfer by 
private actors, but merely permit it. By the same token, the 
recognition of marijuana property under state law merely permits 
such ownership, without requiring it. Accordingly, compliance with 
both federal and state law is not physically impossible. Under this 
analysis, federal and state law can “consistently stand together” as 
section 903 contemplates.116 
 
 109.  See White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc. v. Maricopa Cnty., 386 P.3d 416, 426 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2016) (finding no express preemption under the CSA); R.I. Patient Advocacy Coal. 
Found. v. Town of Smithfield, No. PC-2017-2989, 2017 WL 4419055 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 
2017).  
 110.  21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (disclaiming any congressional intent to “occupy the field” as a 
general matter). 
 111.  Id. See also supra notes 97–103. 
 112.  See White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc., 386 P.3d 416 (finding no field preemption under 
the CSA); R.I. Patient Advocacy Coal. Found., 2017 WL 4419055. 
 113.  See Brilmayer, supra note 4 at 902–11 (arguing that the CSA does not preempt state 
laws legalizing marijuana); Chemerinsky et al., supra note 4, at 100–13 (same). 
 114.  846 N.W.2d 531, 544 (Mich. 2014).  
 115.  R.I. Patient Advocacy Coal. Found., 2017 WL 4419055, at *6; see also City of Palm 
Springs v. Luna Crest, Inc., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128, 131–33 (Ct. App. 2016) (affirming trial court’s 
determination that federal law does not preempt city’s regulation of medical marijuana).  
 116.  Preemption on this basis might arise in the property context under narrow 
circumstances. For example, where a state court appoints a receiver in a dispute concerning a 
business whose assets include marijuana, the receiver would necessarily take possession of the 
marijuana; in this situation, it would be physically impossible to comply with both federal and 
state law. Cf. People v. Crouse, 388 P.3d 39, 43 (Colo. 2017) (finding preemption where state 
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Similarly, most courts reject preemption arguments based on the 
general assertion that state marijuana legalization laws pose an 
obstacle to the federal approach.117 As the Arizona Supreme Court 
stated in Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggatt, “[a] state law stands as an obstacle 
to a federal law ‘[i]f the purpose of the [federal law] cannot otherwise 
be accomplished . . . .’”118 The court reasoned that the “state-law 
immunity” created by Arizona’s medical marijuana law did not 
“frustrate the CSA’s goal of conquering drug abuse or controlling 
drug traffic . . . [because] the people of Arizona ‘chose to part ways 
with Congress only regarding the scope of acceptable medical use of 
marijuana.’”119 Moreover, as another court explained, its state law 
legalizing marijuana “does not (and could not) deny the federal 
government the ability to enforce the CSA, and does not (and could 
not) immunize medical marijuana users from prosecution.”120 In the 
same manner, state recognition of marijuana property is not an 
obstacle to enforcement of the CSA by the federal government.121 The 
federal government is free to enforce the CSA within legalization 
states if it chooses to do so, even though these states recognize 
marijuana property under state law. 
In short, the state laws that effectively recognize marijuana 
property are not preempted under any of the four tests. If there were 
any doubt about this outcome, the strong presumption against 
superseding state laws that govern property—a field traditionally 
occupied by the states—would tip the balance against preemption. 
 
law required police officers to return marijuana to acquitted medical marijuana patient because 
this was an illegal distribution of a controlled substance under federal law). But see City of 
Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 677–78 (Ct. App. 2008).  
 117.  See also Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 111 (arguing that state legalization laws are 
consistent with the purposes and objectives of the CSA).  
 118.  347 P.3d 136, 141 (Ariz. 2015) (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 
U.S. 363, 373 (2000)).  
 119.  Id. (quoting Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Mich. 2014)).  
 120.  R.I. Patient Advocacy Coal. Found., 2017 WL 4419055, at *7. See also City of Palm 
Springs, 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128, 131–33 (finding no obstacle preemption).  
 121.  However, some courts have found conflict preemption to parts of state legalization 
laws in specific circumstances. See, e.g., People v. Crouse, 388 P.3d 39, 41–43 (Colo. 2017) 
(finding preemption of law that required police officers to return marijuana to acquitted 
medical marijuana patient, because such return was a distribution of a controlled substance); 
Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. BOLI, 230 P.3d 518, 536 (Or. 2010) (finding limited 
preemption because state’s issuance of medical marijuana card to patient affirmatively 
authorized use of marijuana).  
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3. Federalism Policies and Preemption 
Ultimately, the preemption doctrine seeks to preserve the 
constitutional balance between federal and state governments. The 
normative justifications that underpin our federal system further 
support the conclusion that state laws recognizing marijuana property 
are not preempted. The preemption question will almost certainly be 
resolved by state courts,122 not federal courts, and accordingly state 
judges should consider these policies in the decision process. 
As the Supreme Court explained in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the joint 
sovereign structure of federalism provides important benefits: 
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive 
to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases 
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it 
allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; 
and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in 
competition for a mobile citizenry.123 
These policy goals are best served by finding that state laws 
recognizing marijuana property are not preempted.124 
First, recognition of marijuana property both addresses the 
diverse needs of our society and allows for experimentation in 
government. It accommodates the wishes of the millions of Americans 
who use marijuana in states that have chosen legalization. Further, it 
allows the states, as proverbial laboratories of democracy, to test the 
value of marijuana legalization. 
A court considering preemption cannot ignore the legal 
environment in which the question arises. The ongoing tension 
between the federal government and legalization states over 
marijuana is akin to an unstable détente.125 While maintaining that 
 
 122.  In most states, decisions by lower federal courts are merely persuasive authority, not 
binding precedent. See Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower 
Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 62 (2015). 
Therefore, even if federal courts of appeal and district courts have previously ruled on the 
question of preemption, state courts are entitled to decide the issue based on their own 
interpretation of the law.  
 123.  501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).  
 124.  These federalism justifications endorsed by the Gregory Court were based on Michael 
W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491–
1511 (1987) and Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism 
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1988). Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. See also David 
Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 783 (2017) (listing additional 
justifications).  
 125.  See, e.g., Green Earth Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 3d 
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state legalization statutes are invalid under the Supremacy Clause as a 
theoretical matter, the federal government has diplomatically chosen 
to tolerate the status quo for years except in extreme situations126—
and, accordingly, has tacitly accepted that marijuana property can 
exist under state law.127 By its inaction, the federal government has 
acknowledged that legalization both responds to the diverse needs of 
our society and allows for potentially helpful experimentation. 
For the last ten years, federal interest in enforcing the marijuana 
ban in legalization states has been tepid at best.128 In a series of 
memoranda issued between 2009 and 2013 during the Obama 
administration, including the “Cole memorandum,” the Department 
of Justice gradually deprioritized federal enforcement in states that 
legalized marijuana as long as certain federal policy priorities were 
respected.129 Because the state programs did not infringe these 
priorities, the memoranda effectively acquiesced to state 
legalization.130 Moreover, in 2014 Congress adopted the Rohrabacher-
 
821, 832–33 (D. Colo. 2016) (observing that “the nominal federal prohibition against possession 
of marijuana conceals a far more nuanced (and perhaps even erratic) expression of federal 
Policy” given public statements by federal officials “that reflected an ambivalence toward 
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act where a person or entity’s possession and 
distribution of marijuana was consistent with well-regulated state law”); Green Cross Med., Inc. 
v. Gally, 395 P.3d 302, 308–09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (refusing to invalidate a contract on the 
basis that it facilitated the illegal possession, use, and sale of marijuana, in part because of “the 
federal government’s lack of interest” in prosecuting people who comply with the state’s 
medical marijuana law).  
 126.  See infra text accompanying notes 128–37 (discussing federal responses to state 
legalization statutes).  
 127.  Even within legalization states, however, federal law governs activities that occur on 
federal lands such as national parks, national forests, military installations, and lands governed 
by the Bureau of Land Management. See infra text accompanying notes 166–68.  
 128.  The federal government has focused its anti-marijuana enforcement efforts on “large-
scale traffickers and drug cartels.” OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 52, at 472. Given the 
limits imposed on marijuana possession and transfer by legalization states, it is highly unlikely 
that these state laws would shield such traffickers or cartels.  
 129.  See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
all U.S. Attys, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of 
Marijuana (Oct. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united-state-
attorneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-states; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo 
in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use (June 29, 2011), 
http://files.ctctcdn.com/201bc6cf001/10f50403-6ee6-4e47-bbc3-ed48d1912bbb.pdf; Memorandum 
from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys, Marijuana 
Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) (hereafter “Cole Memorandum”), http://files.ctctcdn.com/ 
201bc6cf001/10f50403-6ee6-4e47-bbc3-ed48d1912bbb.pdf.  
 130.  The eight federal priorities were to prevent the distribution of marijuana to minors; 
prevent revenue from marijuana sales from going to criminals; prevent diversion of marijuana to 
states where it was illegal; prevent marijuana activity from being used as a pretext for other 
illegal activity; prevent violence in the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; prevent adverse 
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Farr Amendment to an omnibus spending bill, which prohibited the 
Department of Justice from using federal funds to prevent the 
implementation of state laws legalizing medical marijuana.131 In 
United States v. McIntosh, the Ninth Circuit concluded that this 
amendment not only barred direct action against such states, but also 
precluded federal prosecution of medical marijuana growers and 
retailers whose activities complied with state law.132 
This lack of enforcement has continued under the Trump 
administration. On the one hand, former Attorney General Jefferson 
Sessions issued a new memorandum essentially rescinding the 
Obama-era approach.133 Yet Congress extended the financial ban on 
medical marijuana prosecution in a 2018 spending bill, which 
President Trump signed.134 Further, during the current administration 
“there have apparently been no federal raids or seizures at pot 
companies for sales that are legal under state law”—and thus in 
practice the Obama-era policy is still being followed.135 Most recently, 
current Attorney General William Barr expressly revived part of this 
policy by indicating that the Department of Justice will not “go after 
companies that have relied on the Cole memorandum.”136 Indeed, 
President Trump has expressed tentative support for federal 
legislation that would respect state legalization laws.137 
 
public health consequences associated with marijuana; prevent the growing of marijuana on 
public lands; and prevent marijuana possession or use on federal property. See Cole 
Memorandum, supra note 129. 
 131.  Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 
§ 538, 128 Stat 1230, 2217 (2014).  
 132.  833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016).  
 133.  Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to all U.S. 
Attorneys, Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1022196/download.  
 134.  Trump Signs Spending Bill That Included Medical Marijuana Protections, MARIJUANA 
BUS. DAILY, Mar. 23, 2018, https://mjbizdaily.com/trump-signs-spending-bill-includes-medical-
marijuana-protections/.  
 135.  Evan Halper, Trump inclined to back ending pot ban, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2018, 2018 
WLNR 17754974. The same article quotes John Vardaman, a former Department of Justice 
attorney who participated in creating the Obama-era approach, as saying: “Remarkably little, if 
anything, has changed. Almost every U.S. attorney in states where marijuana is legal has 
decided to apply the same principles.” Id. On an overall basis, “[t]here have been dramatic 
declines in marijuana arrests in states that have legalized.” Tamar Todd, The Benefits of 
Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, 23 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 99, 106 (2018).  
 136.  Kyle Jaeger, Trump Attorney General Nominee Won’t Go After Legal Marijuana 
Businesses, MARIJUANA MOMENT, Jan. 15, 2019, https://www.marijuanamoment.net/trump-
attorney-general-nominee-pledges-not-to-go-after-legal-marijuana-businesses/. 
 137.  Halper, supra note 135 (quoting President Trump as saying that he would 
“probably . . . end up supporting” a proposed bill allowing states to legalize marijuana).  
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Second, legalization of marijuana—and the concomitant 
recognition of marijuana property—reflects citizen involvement in the 
political process. In many states, legalization occurred as a direct 
result of voter initiatives, while in others it stemmed from public 
pressure on legislators. Moreover, the arc of history is moving toward 
nationwide legalization at some point in the future. For example, a 
recent survey shows that 93% of Americans support the legalization 
of marijuana for medical purposes—including overwhelming 
majorities of Republican, Democratic, and independent voters.138 
Today 63% of Americans favor national legalization for all purposes, 
and this percentage will probably increase over time with 
demographic transition because support is strongest among those 
under 65 years old.139 
Finally, honoring property rights in marijuana makes government 
more responsive to citizen needs, thus creating competition among the 
states for a mobile citizenry. As noted above, legal marijuana is the 
fastest-growing industry in the United States.140 Businesses involved in 
growing, processing, and selling marijuana are premised on the 
existence of state laws that will protect their property rights. Third 
parties that do business with marijuana businesses—such as insurers, 
landlords, and lenders—similarly rely on the continued success of 
those entities, and hence on the existence of marijuana property. 
Consistent with our tradition of federalism, each state should be 
allowed to determine whether it will recognize marijuana property, 
and thus attract citizens from other states. 
It is axiomatic that property rights comprise the foundation of 
every market economy. As intended by the Framers, this foundation is 
governed by state law. Thus, each state government is essentially 
administering its own property law system and must use a definition 
of property that is stable and functional in order to respond to societal 
needs. For example, state laws govern on-going business relationships 
involving property, including financing, insurance, investments, leases, 
sales, and other relationships. State courts must divide property 
 
 138.  Quinnipiac University Poll, Support for Marijuana Hits New High, Apr. 16, 2018, 
https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2539. Legalization of medical marijuana 
is supported by 86% of Republicans, 97% of Democrats, and 95% of independent voters. Id.  
 139.  Support for national legalization of marijuana is closely tied to demographics. Among 
Americans between 18 and 34 years old, 82% favor it; in the 35–49 year age group, support is at 
70%; in the 50-64 year age group, it is at 63%. Id. In contrast, 52% of those 65 and over oppose 
legalization. Id.  
 140.  See supra note 7.  
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among co-owners in many situations, such as divorce,141 intestate 
succession, partition, and partnership dissolution. Further, state law 
provides remedies when property-related disputes occur, such as tort 
or contract claims. Having legalized marijuana under state law, state 
governments cannot turn their backs on the property rights they have 
created—and their decisions to create such rights in response to 
citizen needs are entitled to deference by the federal government. 
E. Challenges Posed by the Hybrid System 
1. Toward the Hybrid System 
In sum, the CSA does not preempt state laws legalizing 
marijuana142 and, accordingly, the state laws that effectively recognize 
marijuana property have full force and effect. The time has come to 
acknowledge that this conflict creates a hybrid property system: 
marijuana property exists under state law but not federal law. As a 
result, the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of each 
legalization state will respect and protect property rights in marijuana 
even though their federal counterparts will not. 
For example, in City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court,143 a 
California appellate court ordered that marijuana seized by police 
during a traffic stop be returned to the driver, who held a physician’s 
approval to use marijuana for medical reasons. Acknowledging that 
the driver’s “marijuana possession was legal under state law, but 
illegal under federal law,”144 the court reasoned that the Controlled 
Substances Act did not preempt the California law on point. It 
accordingly held that “due process and fundamental fairness” 
required the return of the marijuana,145 consistent with “the principles 
of federalism embodied in the United States Constitution.”146 
Recognition of the hybrid system is a first step toward mitigating 
the tension between the federal and state approaches. Once this 
practical reality is accepted, courts and scholars can begin charting the 
 
 141.  Cf. Muridan v. Redl, 413 P.3d 1072, 1081–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018) (affirming trial 
court’s determination that proceeds from the sale of marijuana equipment constituted 
community-like property and were thus subject to “equitable property division” upon the 
termination of a couple’s relationship).  
 142.  See also OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 52, at 146–52.  
 143.  68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656, 680 (Ct. App. 2008).  
 144.  Id. at 670.  
 145.  Id. at 680. But see Barrios v. Cnty. of Tulare, No. 1:13-CV-1665AWI/GSA, 2014 WL 
2174746, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (contra).  
 146.  City of Garden Grove, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 682.  
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legal terrain governed by each approach, and marijuana owners can 
structure their affairs to best protect their property rights. 
2. Judicial Recognition of the System 
The outline of the hybrid system can already be discerned in a 
handful of cases. No decision has expressly held that state law 
authorizes marijuana ownership despite conflicting federal law. But 
some courts have implicitly embraced this approach in cases dealing 
with property rights related to marijuana.147 
The hybrid approach is reflected in certain decisions dealing with 
the vertical dimension of property rights. An example is Schmidt v. 
County of Nevada,148 where a federal district court rejected the 
plaintiff’s claim under the Constitution for damages following the 
destruction of his marijuana, even though his right to possession was 
protected by California’s medical marijuana law. It reasoned that 
“plaintiff cannot recover damages as a result of the confiscation or 
destruction of marijuana because he had no cognizable property 
interest in the marijuana. Plaintiff asserts a due process claim under 
the federal Constitution in federal court where, under federal law, 
marijuana is undisputably [sic] illegal and contraband per se.”149 As a 
later federal court summarized in Little v. Gore: 
[E]ven though “state law creates a property interest, not all state-
created rights rise to the level of a constitutionally protected 
interest.” With respect to medical marijuana, although California 
state law may create a property interest in the marijuana, 
California district [that is, federal] courts have found there is no 
protected interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.150 
 
 147.  See, e.g., Barrios, 2014 WL 2174746, at *5 (“Although California may provide Barrios 
with the right to possess medical marijuana, federal law does not. Because marijuana is 
contraband under federal law, Barrios had no property interest that was protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.”); Mazin v. True, No. 1:14-CV-00654-REB-CBS, 
2015 WL 1228321, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 16, 2015) (“The plaintiff argues that state law defines 
property rights and consideration of overlaying federal law is of no consequence when resolving 
his claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. As a matter of law, this position is 
incorrect. ‘Although the underlying substantive interest is created by an independent source 
such as state law, federal constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of 
a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Town of 
Castlerock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005)).  
 148.  No. 2:10-CV-3022FCD/EFB, 2011 WL 2967786, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2011).  
 149.  Id. at *6 (emphasis added).  
 150.  148 F. Supp. 3d 936, 955 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Brady v. Gebbie, 859 F.2d 1543, 
1548 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added). See also River North Props., LLC v. City of Denver, 
No. 13-CV-01410-CMA-CBS, 2014 WL 7437048, at *5 (D. Colo. Dec. 30, 2014), (granting 
motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims on the basis that plaintiff had not pleaded a “cognizable 
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In contrast, the California appellate court in City of Garden Grove v. 
Superior Court mandated that local police return marijuana to the 
owner following its seizure because the “marijuana possession was 
legally sanctioned under state law.”151 
Moreover, a few decisions implicitly utilize the hybrid approach in 
the horizontal dimension, recognizing the existence of marijuana 
property in litigation among private actors. For example, in Green 
Earth Wellness Center v. Atain Specialty Insurance Co., a commercial 
marijuana grower sued its insurance company for compensation after 
smoke and ash damaged marijuana plants.152 The policy provisions 
covered damage to “Business Personal Property.”153 The federal 
district court denied the insurance company’s motion for summary 
judgment, reasoning that (1) “Property” as defined in the policy could 
include marijuana plants and (2) the policy exclusion for 
“Contraband” was “rendered ambiguous by the difference between 
the federal government’s de jure and de facto public policies regarding 
state-regulated medical marijuana.”154 
Similarly, in Green Cross Medical, Inc. v. Gally, an Arizona 
appellate court refused to invalidate a lease between a landowner and 
a state-licensed medical marijuana dispensary operator on the theory 
that it was an illegal contract because it facilitated “possession, use, or 
sale of marijuana” in violation of the CSA.155 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court emphasized “the federal government’s lack of 
interest in prosecuting individuals in compliance with [the state’s 
medical marijuana law], as well as a public policy that favors 
enforcement of the lease compliant with state law.”156 
3. Contours of the System 
Under the hybrid system, property rights in marijuana located 
within the borders of a legalization state should be treated like any 
other form of property under state law—no better and no worse. 
Assume again that farmer G grows marijuana in a legalization state in 
a manner that complies with state law. Her property rights should be 
recognized and enforced by the courts of that state in both the 
 
property interest” in the cultivation of marijuana under the federal Constitution).  
 151.  City of Garden Grove, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 680 (emphasis added).  
 152.  163 F. Supp. 3d 821, 823 (D. Colo. 2016).  
 153.  Id. at 827.  
 154.  Id. at 833.  
 155.  395 P.3d 302, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).  
 156.  Id. at 308.  
SPRANKLING_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2019  8:10 PM 
2019] OWNING MARIJUANA 31 
horizontal and vertical dimensions, including the following sample 
situations.157 
Parties to business transactions in legalization states should be 
entitled to rely on state law to protect their marijuana property. For 
example, the law should recognize the authority of attorneys-in-fact, 
conservators, corporate officers, guardians, partners, trustees,158 and 
others to hypothecate, lease, sell, or otherwise transfer such property. 
Similarly, parties to contracts that relate to marijuana property must 
be entitled to rely on the validity of such contracts under state law, 
without concern that such a contract might be held invalid as illegal or 
against public policy.159 And state courts should adjudicate disputes 
concerning title to marijuana. 
Property rights in marijuana should also be respected in 
legalization states in situations where property is to be divided among 
co-owners. Thus, in divorce proceedings, marijuana property should be 
deemed to be community property for allocation in community 
property states160 and marital property subject to equitable 
distribution in separate property states. For example, if H divorces I in 
a separate property state that has legalized marijuana, marijuana 
owned by H should be subject to equitable distribution. Similarly, 
courts should treat marijuana property like any other type of property 
when distributing assets pursuant to a will, trust, or intestate 
succession. Further, courts should allocate marijuana property like 
 
 157.  Similarly, the owner of marijuana property will be subject to all liabilities that are 
generally imposed on property. For example, creditors should be able to levy on such property 
to satisfy judgments.  
 158.  Cf. Green Cross Med., Inc. v. Gally, 395 P.3d 302, 303 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (trustee 
leased trust property to tenant for use as medical marijuana dispensary).  
 159.  Even certain federal courts have refused to invalidate marijuana-related contracts on 
this basis. See, e.g., Green Earth Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 3d 
821, 834–35 (D. Colo. 2016) (insurance policy); Mann v. Gullickson, No. 15-CV-03630-MEJ, 
2016 WL 6473215, at *7–9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016) (promissory note). Cf. Kinetic Dev. LLC v. 
Sky Unlimited LLC, No. 17-CV-0562-WJM-MLC, 2017 WL 6523512 (D. Colo. Nov. 22, 2017) 
(granting motion to remand case involving real estate purchase contract to state court on basis 
that no federal question existed, despite contingency in contract that buyer obtain a license to 
sell marijuana on the property). See also Green Cross Med., Inc., 395 P.3d 302, 309 (refusing to 
invalidate lease). But see Haeberle v. Lowden, No. 2011CV709, 2012 WL 7149098, at *5 (Colo. 
Dist. Ct. Aug. 8, 2012) (refusing to enforce contract for sale of marijuana). See also Luke M. 
Scheuer, Are “Legal” Marijuana Contracts “Illegal”?, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 31 (2015).  
 160.  Cf. Muridan v. Redl, 413 P.3d 1072, 1081–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018) (affirming trial 
court’s determination that proceeds from the sale of marijuana equipment constituted 
community-like property and were thus subject to “equitable property division” upon the 
termination of a couple’s relationship).  
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any other asset when dissolving a corporation, partnership, or other 
business entity, or partitioning cotenancy property. 
Finally, state courts should provide the owner of marijuana 
property with the normal remedies that any owner has against 
tortious actions of third parties that injure property. For instance, if J 
negligently burns K’s marijuana, K should be entitled to recover 
damages from J. Similarly, marijuana property should be recognized in 
the context of other tort actions, such as conversion and trespass. 
However, under the hybrid system marijuana property is not 
recognized under federal law and thus receives no federal protection. 
Thus, in the vertical dimension, there is a risk that federal authorities 
may seize marijuana from a farmer like G in a legalization state, with 
no obligation to pay compensation or otherwise respect her property 
rights under state law. Given the federal government’s anemic 
enforcement efforts in recent years, however, this risk may be more 
theoretical than real. 
A more direct consequence of the hybrid system is that marijuana 
owners are deprived of access to federal courts and agencies in any 
matter relating to the vertical dimension of property rights. For 
example, despite lackluster enforcement of the federal criminal laws 
governing marijuana, federal courts actively continue to treat 
marijuana as contraband per se in civil litigation governed by federal 
laws that involve the vertical dimension—such as banking law, 
constitutional law, environmental law, and tax law.161 
Finally, the system also affects the horizontal dimension of 
property rights under federal law to some degree. For example, farmer 
G could not file for bankruptcy because a federal court cannot 
administer assets that include marijuana without violating the CSA.162 
Nor could she obtain a federal trademark for her marijuana or 
marijuana products.163 
 
 161.  See supra notes 148–50.  
 162.  See, e.g., In re Arenas, 514 B.R. 887, 891 (D. Colo. 2014) (dismissing bankruptcy action 
filed by marijuana growers because its administration would involve “the Court and the Trustee 
in the Debtors’ ongoing criminal violation of the CSA”); In re McGinnis, 453 B.R. 770, 772–73 
(D. Or. 2011) (refusing confirmation of reorganization plan that involved sale and cultivation of 
marijuana).  
 163.  Cf. In re Morgan Brown, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350 (T.T.A.B. 2016) (denying federal 
registration of trademark for store that would sell marijuana).  
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4. Reflections on the System 
The concept that marijuana property can exist within the territory 
of a particular state under state law—but not under federal law—is 
fraught with legal and geographical complexity. This schism will 
inevitably cause confusion and generate litigation. 
For example, the extent to which federal courts will recognize 
marijuana ownership in situations governed by state law, if at all, 
remains hazy. It is conceivable that a federal court in a legalization 
state might defer to state law on the point when adjudicating a state 
law claim,164 such as a diversity action stemming from intentional 
destruction of a marijuana crop.165 Until this uncertainty is resolved, 
there is a significant risk that litigants will take strategic advantage of 
the hybrid system in forum shopping or removal proceedings. A 
marijuana owner in a legalization state will presumably avoid filing 
actions in federal court, given the danger that the court will not honor 
her property rights. Conversely, a party to a dispute with a marijuana 
owner may file a preemptive lawsuit in federal court with the hope 
that the choice of forum will effectively prohibit the owner from 
obtaining relief. Similarly, where a marijuana property owner sues in 
state court, the defendant may seek to remove the action to federal 
court—solely to benefit from the federal view that marijuana 
property cannot exist. 
In situations where state and federal courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction—for example, a claim against a city arising under both the 
federal Due Process Clause and a parallel clause in the state 
constitution—presumably a state court in a legalization jurisdiction 
would recognize marijuana property, even though a federal court 
would not do so in the same setting. Yet this outcome is by no means 
certain. 
Individuals and businesses involved in transactions relating to 
marijuana property can minimize the risks inherent in the hybrid 
system by utilizing contract clauses that mandate arbitration, 
mediation, or other forms of alternative dispute resolution. Where the 
selected method requires application of law, the contract should 
contain a choice of law clause that selects the law of the legalization 
 
 164.  Cf. Green Earth Wellness Ctr., LLC, 163 F. Supp. 3d 821, 827–28 (treating marijuana 
plants as covered property under an insurance policy).  
 165.  Just as marijuana is generally considered to be “property” for the purposes of property 
crimes such as theft, the same policy concern against intentional misconduct should extend to 
intentional torts that cause damage. See supra note 48.  
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state to govern disputes. Even if the parties to a transaction prefer not 
to use alternative dispute resolution, their contract should at least 
include such a choice of law clause. 
The hybrid system also produces geographical uncertainty. The 
Constitution provides that Congress has broad power to enact 
legislation governing activities on lands owned by the federal 
government.166 Thus, even within a legalization state, federal law will 
govern activities on public lands within that state that are owned by 
the federal government.167 These include lands controlled by the 
National Park Service, the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land 
Management, the Department of Defense, and other federal agencies. 
In fact, the federal government owns huge tracts of land in states that 
have legalized marijuana. For example, federal lands comprise 45.8% 
of California and 35.9% of Colorado.168 As a practical matter, it may 
be difficult for individuals and entities to know where marijuana 
property is legally recognized, even within legalization states. As an 
illustration, lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management are 
frequently leased to private parties for grazing or mineral extraction; 
the boundaries between these lands (subject to federal law) and 
adjacent private-owned parcels (subject to state law) may not be 
marked. 
In sum, the hybrid system effectively creates two inconsistent sets 
of rules for marijuana property within a legalization state. Marijuana 
property can exist under state law—except on lands owned by the 
federal government. At the same time, under federal law, marijuana 
property will not be recognized by federal courts under most 
circumstances, nor will it be honored by other branches of the federal 
government. 
III. STATE V. STATE: THE MARIJUANA PROPERTY CONUNDRUM 
A. Interstate Conflicts 
Marijuana property conflicts can also arise in the interstate 
context.169 Unsurprisingly, the categories of tangible things in which 
 
 166.  See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 17.  
 167.  Id. art IV, § 3, cl. 2.  
 168.  Daniel Johnson & Pratheek Rebala, Here’s Where the Federal Government Owns the 
Most Land, TIME, Jan. 5, 2016, http://time.com/4167983/federal-government-land-oregon/.  
 169.  This Part assumes that the CSA does not preempt state legalization statutes, for the 
reasons discussed in Part II.  
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property rights may exist vary somewhat among states. For example, 
some states permit private ownership of certain animals (e.g., lions)170 
or drugs (e.g., peyote),171 while others do not.172 Historically, litigation 
involving conflicts between such state laws has been rare. But given 
the size and growth rate of the legal marijuana industry—and the 
sharp disagreement among state laws governing marijuana—it is 
inevitable that interstate conflicts will occur. 
Many states still follow the view that the possession or transfer of 
marijuana is a criminal offense. For instance, Idaho classifies 
marijuana as a Schedule I substance under its controlled substances 
law.173 It is unlawful for any person to cultivate, transfer, or possess 
marijuana in Idaho,174 and any such marijuana is “subject to 
forfeiture.”175 Thus, marijuana is contraband per se in the state and, 
accordingly, property rights cannot exist in marijuana located within 
its borders.176 
Consider an example of a potential interstate conflict. Suppose L 
and M are married in a separate property state that recognizes 
marijuana property. L operates a legal business that sells recreational 
marijuana in that state; M later moves to another separate property 
state that does not recognize marijuana property, where he establishes 
a new domicile and files for divorce. Will the forum state treat L’s 
marijuana property as “property” for purposes of equitable 
distribution and accordingly award a share to M? 
 
 170.  See Born Free USA, Summary of State Laws Relating to Private Possession of Exotic 
Animals, http://www.bornfreeusa.org/b4a2_exotic_animals_summary.php (last updated May 
2016) (listing state laws on ownership of exotic animals). 
 171.  See David Bogen & Leslie F. Goldstein, Culture, Religion and Indigenous People, 69 
MD. L. REV. 48, 61–62 (2009) (discussing the exemption of religious use of peyote from federal 
drug laws and most state drug laws). Although peyote is a Schedule I drug under the CSA, there 
is a regulatory exception for its use in religious ceremonies. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2018).  
 172.  For example, Connecticut and Kentucky prohibit private ownership of lions, with 
special exceptions for zoos and other research institutions. See Born Free USA, supra note 170. 
See also Bogen & Goldstein, supra note 171, at 61–62 (noting that some states did not allow the 
use of peyote for any purpose before the American Indian Religious Freedom Act 
Amendments of 1994 were passed).  
 173.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 37-2705(d)(19) (West 2018) (listing the substance as 
“marihuana”).  
 174.  Id. § 37-2732(a) provides that “it is unlawful for any person to manufacture or 
deliver . . . a controlled substance.” The term “manufacture” includes “propagation” or growing, 
while the term “deliver” is defined as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one 
(1) person to another of a controlled substance.” Id. § 37-2701(g), (s). Further, “[i]t is unlawful 
for any person to possess a controlled substance.” Id. § 37-2732(c). 
 175.  Id. § 37-2744(a)(1).  
 176.  See supra text accompanying notes 71–72.  
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The same issue can arise between a full legalization state and a 
medical marijuana state. Applying this variant to the L-M 
hypothetical above, would the forum state that has only legalized 
medical marijuana award M any share in L’s recreational marijuana 
property?177 
The common theme in these examples is that litigation arises from 
a relationship that involves two states: the state where the legal 
marijuana is located and the forum state that has a more restrictive 
approach.178 It is unlikely that interstate conflicts would arise between 
two states that share the same legalization approach, either two full 
legalization states or two medical marijuana states. Similarly, such 
interstate disputes will not occur between two ban states because 
neither would recognize marijuana property. 
This interstate conflict concern applies with equal force to many 
other situations involving property rights, including: the authority of 
attorneys-in-fact, conservators, corporate officers, guardians, partners, 
trustees, and others to hypothecate, lease, sell, or otherwise transfer 
marijuana property; the validity of contracts for these purposes; 
disputes concerning title to marijuana; distribution of marijuana 
property pursuant to a will, trust, or intestate succession; dissolution 
of corporations, partnerships, and other business entities that own 
marijuana property; partition of cotenancies owning marijuana 
property; and tort actions stemming from injury to marijuana. 
These situations all present a choice-of-law question: Will the 
forum state utilize its own law or the law of the legalization state?179 
Regrettably, modern choice-of-law theory is in “considerable 
disarray,” while “[t]he disarray in the courts may be worse” because a 
number of approaches are currently in use.180 At bottom, however, 
 
 177.  Another variant situation is a conflict between a ban state and a Native American tribe 
that legalizes marijuana on its reservation in that state. See OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 
52, at 166–71.  
 178.  See, e.g., Ginsburg v. ICC Holdings, No. 3:16:CV-2311-D, 2017 WL 5467688, at *8 
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2017) (refusing to dismiss breach of contract claim relating to defendants’ 
medical marijuana business where contract selected Illinois law, which authorized medical 
marijuana, but suit was brought in Texas because “defendants fail to cite any authority in 
support of their apparent position that, under federal and Texas law, a contract with the 
purpose of funding an organization that is violating or intends to violate federal law is 
automatically void or unenforceable”). 
 179.  This analysis assumes that federal law does not preempt marijuana legalization 
statutes, as discussed in Part II.D above.  
 180.  WILLIAM M. RICHMAN ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 285 (4th ed. 
2013).  
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interstate disputes related to marijuana property present two basic 
choice-of-law variants. First, where the applicable choice-of-law rule 
directs the forum state to use the law of the legalization state, should 
the forum state refuse to do so based on its own public policy? 
Second, where the applicable rule permits the forum state to use its 
own law, should it instead use the law of the legalization state as a 
matter of comity? 
B. Legalization State v. Ban State 
1. Situs Law and Public Policy 
In most relevant situations, the applicable choice-of-law rule will 
direct the forum state to use the law of the legalization state—thereby 
recognizing marijuana property. The forum state should not refuse to 
do so based on a public policy objection.181 
As a general rule, ownership interests in a tangible thing are 
determined by the law of the state that “has the most significant 
relationship to the thing and the parties” in litigation.182 The 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law provides that seven 
principles should be used in making this determination: (a) “the needs 
of the interstate or international system;” (b) “the relevant policies of 
the forum;” (c) “the relevant policies of other interested states and 
the relative interests of other states in the determination of the 
particular issue;” (d) “the protection of justified expectations;” (e) 
“the basic policies underlying the particular field of law;” (f) 
“certainty, predictability and uniformity of result”; and (g) “ease in 
the determination and application of the law to be applied.”183 This 
analysis usually results in the forum state using the law of the state 
where the particular thing is located. Thus, a leading treatise 
concludes that “[s]itus law is likely to be most appropriately 
concerned with goods within the confines of the state.”184 Under the 
Restatement approach, the law of the legalization state will usually 
 
 181.  Of course, a litigant may choose not to raise such an objection for strategic reasons. 
The plaintiff who brings a divorce action in a ban state against a spouse who operates a 
marijuana business in a legalization state, for example, would benefit from avoiding use of the 
forum state law. 
 182.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 222 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).  
 183.  Id. § 6 
 184.  PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1217 (6th ed. 2018). Cf. Itar-Tass Russian 
News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that Russian law 
determined ownership of a copyright, but that United States law determined whether the 
copyright was infringed in the United States).  
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have the most significant relationship to the marijuana and the parties 
to the dispute, and thus will normally govern, particularly because the 
marijuana is physically located outside of the forum state’s territory.185 
In addition, choice-of-law rules will direct the forum state to use 
the law of the legalization state in a number of specific situations. For 
example, the validity and effect of a contract for the sale of goods—
including marijuana—is typically governed by the choice-of-law 
clause in the contract. Given the risk of interstate conflicts, prudent 
contracting parties will insert a clause selecting the law of the 
legalization state to govern disputes.186 Similarly, the validity of 
security interests in personal property are governed by the law of the 
state where the debtor resides, which in the context of marijuana 
property litigation would usually be a legalization state.187 A parallel 
rule applies to divorce proceedings, where interests in personal 
property are usually determined by the law of the marital domicile 
when the asset is acquired.188 Another example is a tort action 
concerning injury to tangible personal property, which is governed by 
the law of the state where the injury occurs.189 
However, it is well settled that the forum state may utilize its law 
when the use of another state’s law would violate its own public 
policy.190 As the Supreme Court noted in Baker v. General Motors 
Corporation, “[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel ‘a 
state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes 
dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to 
legislate.’”191 Moreover, the Court explained, “[a] court may be guided 
by the forum State’s ‘public policy’ in determining the law applicable 
to a controversy.”192 
 
 185.  The conflict between federal law and state law in legalization states arises because 
both the federal government and the relevant state government share sovereign authority over 
the territory where the marijuana is located. In the context of the interstate conflicts, however, 
the forum state has no sovereignty over the territory where the marijuana is located and, 
accordingly, lacks substantial justification for utilizing its own law.  
 186.  U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).  
 187.  Id. § 9-301(1).  
 188.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 258(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).  
 189.  Id. § 147.  
 190.  Unfortunately, “‘[p]ublic policy,’ as every law student well knows . . . is all too often 
employed as a talisman to avoid reasoning on the underlying issues.” RICHMAN, supra note 180, 
at 185.  
 191.  522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 
U.S. 493, 501 (1939)).  
 192.  Id. at 233 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421–24 (1979)). 
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Yet the parties to a consensual transaction relating to marijuana 
property—as in the contract examples above—can minimize the risk 
of a successful public policy objection by using a choice-of-law clause 
that selects the law of the particular legalization state.193 Where the 
parties have utilized such a clause, the scope of the exception is 
narrow; the clause must be enforced unless the “chosen state has no 
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction” or 
application of the chosen law would be “contrary to a fundamental 
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest in the 
determination of the particular issue.”194 It would be difficult to argue 
successfully that this exception applies to a transaction in a 
legalization state that involves marijuana property. In this situation, 
the forum state has no relationship to the transaction and no 
substantial relation to any parties based in a legalization state. 
Further, the legalization state would have the “greater interest” in 
applying its own public policy in favor of marijuana property. 
The public policy exception applies with somewhat greater force 
where no choice-of-law clause is involved—for example, in the 
divorce and tort illustrations discussed above. Restatement (Second) 
of Conflicts of Law § 90 provides that “[n]o action will be entertained 
on a foreign cause of action the enforcement of which is contrary to 
the strong public policy of the forum.”195 But the Comments to this 
section specify that “[a]ctions should rarely be dismissed because of 
the rule of this Section,” quoting Justice Cardozo’s conclusion that 
such a dismissal should not occur unless failure to do so “would 
violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent 
conception of morals, some deep-seated tradition of the 
commonwealth.”196 
A state law that criminalizes the possession or transfer of 
marijuana clearly embodies a public policy against such conduct. 
However, in a marijuana property dispute it is unlikely to qualify as a 
strong public policy. First, although a ban state may have a legitimate 
interest in enforcing this policy against conduct within its own 
 
 193.  Cf. Ginsburg v. ICC Holdings, No. 3:16:CV-2311-D, 2017 WL 5467688, at *5 (N.D. 
Tex. Nov. 13, 2017) (parties to a contract relating to a medical marijuana business selected 
Illinois law, which recognized medical marijuana, to govern but suit was brought in Texas, which 
did not).  
 194.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187(2)(a), (b) (AM. LAW INST. 
1971).  
 195.  Id. § 90.  
 196.  Id. cmt. c (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918)).  
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territory, it has little or no interest in doing so when the conduct 
occurs outside of its borders. Second, given the federal government’s 
anemic enforcement of the CSA, some federal courts have rejected 
public policy attacks in cases relating to marijuana property197—and 
the forum state may have similar misgivings. Finally, application of the 
marijuana ban policy might conflict with a more important policy of 
the forum state on the facts of the particular case. For instance, in a 
divorce action, a spouse domiciled in a legalization state might argue 
that her marijuana property should not be deemed “property” for 
purposes of equitable distribution given the forum’s public policy—
but this would disadvantage the spouse domiciled in the forum state, 
and thus conflict with the policy of allowing a resident spouse to 
receive a fair share of marital assets.198 In sum, a public policy 
objection to the use of a legalization state’s law is unlikely to be 
successful.199 
Finally, even if a public policy objection were otherwise 
appropriate, its use might violate the Due Process Clause. The 
Supreme Court explained in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague that “if a 
State has only an insignificant contact with the parties and the 
occurrence or transaction, application of its law is unconstitutional.”200 
An example is John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates, 
where a New York resident purchased an insurance policy from a 
 
 197.  See, e.g., Green Earth Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 3d 
821, 835 (D. Colo. 2016); Mann v. Gullickson, No. 15-CV-03630-MEJ, 2016 WL 6473215, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016).  
 198.  Alternatively, suppose that a resident of a ban state intentionally destroys marijuana in 
a legalization state, and the owner then sues for damages in the ban state. Applying the anti-
marijuana policy on these facts would conflict with the forum state’s own presumed public 
policy against allowing a person to intentionally injure property owned by another. Even ban 
states will prosecute a person who steals marijuana from its possessor because this conduct 
conflicts with the public policy against theft. See supra note 48.  
 199.  In contrast, a ban state is clearly required to enforce a judgment issued by a 
legalization state that relates to marijuana property, despite a public policy concern. Under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, each state is obligated to respect the “judicial 
Proceedings” of other states. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. There is no public policy exception to this 
rule. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 239 (1908) (White, J., dissenting) (“The court now 
reverses on the ground that the due faith and credit clause obliged the courts of Mississippi, in 
consequence of the action of the Mississippi court, to give efficacy to transactions in Mississippi 
which were criminal, and which were against the public policy of that state.”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 117 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (stating that 
such a judgment must be enforced “even though the strong public policy of the [forum] State 
would have precluded recovery in its courts on the original claim”).  
 200.  449 U.S. 302, 310–11 (1981) (plurality opinion); see also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 
U.S. 397, 410 (1930) (noting that the forum state’s choice of law “may not abrogate the rights of 
parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done within them”).  
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Massachusetts corporation, and the insured’s widow later moved to 
Georgia where she brought suit on the policy under Georgia law.201 
On these facts, the Court held that application of Georgia law was 
unconstitutional due to the state’s de minimis connection.202 Similarly, 
if two parties enter into a contract related to marijuana property in a 
legalization state, without a choice-of-law clause, and one later moves 
to a ban state where he is sued for breach of contract, this contact 
would probably be too minor to allow the use of the ban state’s law. 
2. Forum Law and Comity 
In some situations, a choice-of-law rule will authorize the forum 
state to use its own law in cases involving marijuana—most commonly 
in connection with the division or distribution of property. For 
example, the law of the testator’s domicile at death usually 
determines whether a will transfers any legal interest in tangible 
personal property such as marijuana,203 and also governs rights to 
such property that pass through intestate succession.204 Similarly, 
forum law normally governs the dissolution of a corporation 
incorporated in that state, including the distribution of its property.205 
Yet a ban state’s mechanical use of its own law in such a situation 
produces a troublesome result: the court will not recognize marijuana 
property located in a legalization state as “property” and hence will 
not distribute it to the putative owners. As a result, title to such assets 
will be either appropriated by adverse possession206 or escheat to the 
legalization state.207 Either outcome will injure residents of the ban 
state and unjustly enrich residents of the legalization state. 
Under these circumstances, the ban state might use the 
legalization state’s law as a matter of comity—not because this is 
 
 201.  299 U.S. 178, 179 (1936).  
 202.  Id. at 182–83. 
 203.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 263(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1971); see 
also Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309, 313–16 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (holding that law of domicile at death determined whether testatrix held a right of 
publicity that could be devised). However, a testator can avoid the risk that a ban state might 
invalidate a devise of rights in marijuana property by including a choice-of-law clause in the will 
that directs the use of the law of a legalization state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS 
OF LAW § 264(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (providing that a will that devises “an interest in 
movables is construed in accordance with the local law of the state designated for this purpose 
in the will”).  
 204.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 260 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).  
 205.  HAY, supra note 184, at 1355. 
 206.  See SPRANKLING, supra note 11, at § 7.02. 
 207.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1410 (West 2007). 
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required by choice-of-law rules, but rather because the court 
determines that it is appropriate under the circumstances.208 While 
observing that attorneys who do not specialize in conflict of laws may 
“find the field mystifying, frustrating, and a bit silly,” Larry Kramer 
suggests a number of canons that courts could adopt to clarify the 
subject.209 Two of those canons might be used in cases involving 
marijuana property: one based on obsolescence, the other on reliance. 
First, Kramer argues that “[w]here one of two conflicting laws is 
obsolete (i.e., inconsistent with prevailing legal and social norms in 
the state that enacted it), the other law should be applied.”210 A state 
statute that criminalizes marijuana possession and transfer is likely to 
be inconsistent with social norms even in a ban state because 
marijuana use is increasingly accepted. Further, even in such a state, 
the statute is unlikely to be enforced with vigor. 
Second, he suggests that “[w]here two laws conflict, but the parties 
actually and reasonably relied on one of them, that law should be 
applied.”211 In many situations involving marijuana property, the 
parties will have relied on the belief that such property located in a 
legalization state would be judicially protected. For example, the 
partners who invest in marijuana assets or the testator who devises 
such property presumably all share the same good faith belief that 
their ownership rights will be respected. 
C. Full Legalization State v. Medical Marijuana State 
The choice-of-law issues discussed above may also arise in 
litigation involving a full legalization state and a medical marijuana 
state because the scope of their respective laws will differ. For 
instance, assume that N and O are married in a separate property 
state that has legalized marijuana for all purposes. O establishes a 
farm that legally grows marijuana for recreational use, and N then 
moves to a state that only permits marijuana cultivation under tightly 
controlled circumstances and restricts marijuana use to medical 
purposes. When N files for divorce, will the forum state recognize O’s 
 
 208.  See generally Joseph William Singer, Multistate Justice: Better Law, Comity, and 
Fairness in the Conflict of Laws, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1923 (discussing the role of comity in 
conflict of laws).  
 209.  Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 344 (1990).  
 210.  Id. at 334–35.  
 211.  Id. at 336–37.  
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marijuana property as “property” for purposes of the divorce if it was 
grown in a manner that violates the forum state’s law? 
Where the applicable choice-of-law rule directs the forum state to 
use the legalization state’s law, it seems quite unlikely that a public 
policy objection would succeed. Both states would share the same 
view that marijuana property should be recognized as a general 
matter, even though they disagree on the parameters of ownership. 
Such disagreement can hardly be viewed as a convincing public policy 
objection. A helpful analogy is found in Intercontinental Hotels 
Corporation v. Golden, where the plaintiff brought suit in New York 
to enforce I.O.U.s given by the defendant in payment of gambling 
debts legally incurred at a casino in Puerto Rico.212 Although 
gambling was generally illegal under New York law, the court refused 
to reject the use of Puerto Rico law on public policy grounds, noting 
that the legalization of limited forms of gambling in New York—
”pari-mutuel betting and the operation of bingo games”—indicated 
that “the New York public does not consider authorized gambling” to 
violate public policy.213 Similarly, the partial acceptance of legalized 
marijuana by a medical marijuana state indicates that it does not have 
a strong public policy against marijuana as a general matter. 
Similarly, where the forum state is authorized to use its own law, 
the argument that it should defer to the legalization state’s law as a 
matter of comity is strong. Kramer’s obsolescence canon applies with 
even greater force to a medical marijuana state, since such a state 
already recognizes marijuana property to some extent. The reliance 
canon is also helpful in a medical marijuana state when one or more 
of the affected parties have relied on the law in a legalization state in 
entering into a contract or other relationship concerning marijuana 
located in such a state. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF MARIJUANA PROPERTY 
A. End of Marijuana Détente? 
The legalization wave shows no signs of abating. Given the 
overwhelming popular support for medical marijuana, it is likely that 
additional states will adopt this position in the future. Moreover, 
 
 212.  203 N.E.2d 210, 211 (N.Y. 1964).  
 213.  Id. at 213.  
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campaigns are in progress in a number of states to legalize 
recreational marijuana.214 
The current marijuana détente between the federal government 
and legalization states may ultimately be ended by aggressive federal 
enforcement of the CSA. But the more likely outcome is that the 
status quo will continue into the foreseeable future—as it has for 
many years. The possibility of future legalization should not 
overshadow the importance of grappling with the federal-state and 
interstate conflicts discussed above. Eventually, however, some form 
of new federal legislation may endorse the legalization effort, either 
by sanctioning marijuana on a nationwide basis or by allowing each 
state to decide the issue for itself. Under either approach, there is a 
risk that marijuana property will not be fully protected. 
B. Impact of Nationwide Legalization 
Because most Americans now favor national legalization, in the 
long run the current impasse is likely to be resolved by federal 
legislation that legalizes the possession and transfer of marijuana for 
all purposes throughout the United States.215  Congress clearly has the 
power to adopt such legislation under its authority to regulate 
interstate commerce. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court 
rejected the claim that the CSA’s “prohibition of the manufacture and 
possession of marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and 
possession of marijuana for medical purposes” was not authorized by 
the Commerce Clause.216 It stressed that Congress was empowered to 
“regulate purely local activities” that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce, which includes the cultivation “for home 
consumption, of a fungible commodity for which there is an 
established, albeit illegal, interstate market.”217 Under this logic, the 
legalization of marijuana cultivation, distribution, and possession 
 
 214.  These states include Connecticut, Illinois, and New Jersey. See Christopher Keating, 
Marijuana taxation clears committee, setting stage for final legalization bill, HARTFORD 
COURANT, May 2, 2019, 2019 WLNR 13597382; Tom Schuba, Full, 300-page pot legalization bill 
could be introduced in Illinois within days, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 30, 2019, 2019 WLNR 
13512198; Brent Johnson, Sweeney: ‘50-50’ chance pot bill passes in May, STAR-LEDGER, May 1, 
2019, 2019 WLNR 13518623. 
 215.  Another possibility is that national legislation would legalize the possession and 
transfer of marijuana only for medical purposes. This might be an interim step toward national 
legalization for all purposes. However, national legalization only for medical purposes would 
leave open the issues discussed in Part III.C above.  
 216.  545 U.S. 1, 15 (2005).  
 217.  Id. at 18.  
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would similarly be valid, even as to “purely local activities” within a 
particular state. 
Under this national legalization approach, property rights would 
clearly exist in marijuana in all states as a matter of federal law.218 
Presumably, such a statute would expressly provide that it preempts 
any contrary state laws, so that no uncertainty about preemption 
would arise. This would end the current impasse, but potentially leave 
an open issue: Would the recognition of marijuana property have 
retroactive effect? 
There is a compelling argument that marijuana property already 
exists today in legalization states, as discussed in Part II above. 
However, a national legalization statute should retroactively validate 
marijuana property rights to obviate any lingering uncertainty. Today 
millions of people and tens of thousands of businesses rely on the 
existence of these rights as a practical matter, even though the legal 
status of marijuana property remains officially unsettled.219 
Federal courts traditionally presume that a statute does not have 
retroactive effect “absent clear congressional intent favoring such a 
result.”220 This presumption is applied most frequently in cases 
involving new legislation “affecting contractual or property rights, 
matters in which predictability and stability are of prime 
importance.”221 In the context of marijuana property, however, 
predictability and stability would be enhanced—not imperiled—by 
retroactive application. For this reason, a court might choose not to 
apply the presumption. To avoid uncertainty, however, Congress 
should expressly provide that a national legalization statute has 
retroactive effect. 
C. Impact of State-Option Legalization 
The more likely near-term approach would be federal legislation 
that, by analogy to the historic treatment of alcoholic beverages, 
amends the CSA to provide that each state may legalize the 
possession and transfer of marijuana at its option.222 This recalibration 
could be accomplished through legislation that deletes the reference 
to “marihuana” in Schedule 1 of the CSA, without preempting 
 
 218.  See supra the analysis in Part II. 
 219.  See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.  
 220.  Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).  
 221.  Id. at 271.  
 222.  See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 4, at 116–22 (advocating this approach).  
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contrary state laws.223 Of course, this state-option approach would not 
resolve the interstate conflict problems discussed in Part III above. 
Driven by religious beliefs and health concerns, early twentieth-
century reformers mounted a successful campaign to amend the 
Constitution to ban alcoholic beverages. In 1919, the Eighteenth 
Amendment accordingly prohibited the “manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of intoxicating liquors within [and] the importation 
thereof into . . . the United States . . . for beverage purposes . . . .”224 
The Twenty-first Amendment repealed this prohibition in 1933 but 
provided that any state could restrict such beverages at its option.225 
Its second clause stated that the “transportation or importation into 
any State . . . for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in 
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”226 Accordingly, 
today each state has the power to restrict the distribution and use of 
alcoholic beverages.227 This power is typically delegated to the county 
level and, as a result, today “dry counties” exist in some states where 
the sale of alcohol is either prohibited or tightly controlled.228 
A confluence of public opinion, political reality, and federalism 
theory is fueling movement toward this state-option approach.229 
Although there is determined opposition to national legalization,230 a 
recent poll shows that 74% of Americans favor “protecting states that 
 
 223.  Alternatively, marijuana could be removed from Schedule I by an administrative 
decision of the Drug Enforcement Administration. For a discussion of past efforts to 
administratively reclassify marijuana, see UELMEN & KREIT, supra note 63, at § 3:85. This 
approach would not resolve the interstate conflicts discussed in Part III above.  
 224.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1. Notably, the amendment did not prohibit the 
possession of alcoholic beverages. As a result, alcoholic beverages were not classified as 
contraband per se and could thus be the subject of property rights.  
 225.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
 226.  Id. § 2 (emphasis added).  
 227.  But see Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 493 (2005) (holding that states do not have 
the power to prohibit interstate shipments of alcohol).  
 228.  See Hunter Schwarz, Where in the United States you can’t purchase alcohol, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 2, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/02/where-in-
the-united-states-you-cant-purchase-alcohol/ (identifying ten states that allow counties to 
criminalize the sale or purchase of alcohol).  
 229.  Bills implementing this approach have been introduced in Congress. See, e.g., 
Marijuana Freedom and Opportunity Act, S. 3174, 115th Cong. (2018); Strengthening the Tenth 
Amendment Through Entrusting States Act, S. 3032, 115th Cong. (2018); see also 
Compassionate Access, Research Expansion, and Respect States Act of 2017, H.R. 2920, 115th 
Cong. (2017) (providing an exception for marijuana use for medical purposes if allowed by state 
law).  
 230.  Quinnipiac University Poll, supra note 138. Although 63% of Americans favor the 
national legalization of marijuana, most Republicans disagree: 41% favor this step, while 55% 
oppose it. Id.  
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have legalized medical or recreational marijuana from federal 
prosecution.”231 A variety of political figures,232 including President 
Trump,233 have expressed support for this approach because it 
accommodates the current political reality that states remain divided 
on two key questions: (1) Should marijuana be legalized at all? (2) If 
so, should it be legalized only for medical use or also for recreational 
use? Finally, this approach is consistent with our tradition of 
federalism, under which states are afforded broad discretion in areas 
of social and economic policy. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Restricting 
Commission, it “long recognized the role of the States as laboratories 
for devising solutions to difficult legal problems.”234 
Under the state-option approach, property rights in marijuana 
would clearly exist within legalization states because it would not be 
contraband per se under federal law. But presumably some states 
would retain their existing laws that criminalize its possession and 
transfer; as a result, property rights in marijuana would not exist in 
those states. This creates the risk that marijuana property conflicts 
may arise between legalization states and ban states, despite the 
solutions analyzed in Part III above. 
Accordingly, federal legislation adopting the state-option 
approach should expressly provide that ban states must respect the 
existence of marijuana property in legalization states when interstate 
conflicts occur, whether they arise from business transactions or 
personal relationships. This would preclude a ban state from applying 
its own law to effectively nullify property rights in marijuana located 
outside of its borders.235 
 
 231.  Id. Notably, the same poll indicated that 52% of Republicans favor this approach.  
 232.  See, e.g., Dan Adams, Let states set own pot policies, Senator Warren says as she files 
bill to bar federal interference, BOSTON GLOBE, June 7, 2018, https://www.bostonglobe.com/ 
2018/06/07/sen-warren-pushes-for-federal-clarity-marijuana/FhYzWQa6TJd4kEy9FN0z7I/ 
story.html (discussing support for state option approach by Senators Elizabeth Warren and 
Cory Gardner).  
 233.  Evan Halper, Trump inclined to back ending pot ban, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2018, 2018 
WLNR 17754974 (discussing President Trump saying that he would probably support a bill that 
uses the state-option approach).  
 234.  135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015) (quoting Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009)); see also 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 211 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may . . . serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social . . . experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).  
 235.  In addition, legislation implementing this approach should be retroactive for the 
reasons discussed in Part IV.B. 
SPRANKLING_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2019  8:10 PM 
48 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, marijuana can be owned under state law despite 
conflicting federal law. Yet the hybrid property system produced by 
this divergence will generate uncertainty—and thus litigation—until 
either judicial decisions better chart the terrain between state and 
federal law or marijuana property is legalized through nationwide 
legislation. In the interim, legalization states and ban states will 
struggle with a similar challenge in the interstate setting. 
More broadly, sovereign conflicts over the existence of property 
rights are inevitable in our federal system. The rights recognized by a 
particular state will sometimes be inconsistent with federal law or 
with the law of other states. After the current impasse over marijuana 
property is finally resolved, the problem will recur in other contexts. 
Although the question of marijuana ownership has unique facets, the 
approaches analyzed in this Article may provide a useful framework 
for navigating future conflicts. 
Given the dominant role that state law plays in defining property 
rights under the Tenth Amendment, federal preemption of such rights 
should rarely occur. When it does, federal and state authorities will be 
confronted with a hybrid system where property exists under state law 
but not under federal law. But ultimately these conflicting sovereigns 
will need to accept a certain amount of inconsistency between their 
approaches. 
Conflicts between states over property rights raise different 
problems due to the impossibility of preemption. Private actors can 
circumvent this jurisdictional inconsistency to some extent through 
litigation strategy, choice-of-law clauses, or alternative dispute 
resolution techniques. Where these approaches are not used, the 
forum state should give appropriate deference to the law of the situs 
state, consistent with the traditional view that the situs state has the 
greater interest in the application of its own law. 
Ultimately, federalism is “messy, untidy, and always a little out of 
control,” as Charles Handy observes.236 Our goal in dealing with 
marijuana ownership should be to reduce the systemic friction 
produced by federal-state conflicts and interstate conflicts, while 
appreciating that complete harmonization of property law doctrines is 
 
 236.  CHARLES HANDY, THE AGE OF PARADOX 111 (1994).  
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both unlikely to occur and arguably counterproductive given the 
traditional role of the states as laboratories of democracy. 
 
